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36.  
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TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN.

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31 DEC 1971

# Vengeful Iraqis expel Persians

From DAVID HIRST: Beirut, December 30

Iraq appears to be playing what could prove a dangerous game with Iran. According to the Persian Government, she has expelled about 60,000 Persians in the past few days. They were taken to the Persian frontier and dumped there, in bitter cold, with no roof over their heads.

Border police claim to have detained 3,700 Iraqi nationals, some armed with weapons and explosives, among the refugees.

The figure of 60,000 is probably an exaggeration but there is no doubt that large numbers of Persians have been deported, summarily, roughly, and sometimes brutally, in the past few months. According to Iran about 11,000 were expelled in October, possibly to coincide with the Persepolis festivities.

Iraq's motives seem to be diverse with vindictiveness, born of impotence, presumably one of them. This, as the Persians say, is probably the Ba'athist way of retaliating against Iran's seizure of the Gulf islands, which, for all their propaganda, the Iraqis failed to lift a finger to prevent.

The expulsions also reflect the Ba'athist obsession with security. The Iraqis are forever looking for Persian agents. Iran played a key role in the attempted coup of January, 1970.

But many of those deported have been Kurds rather than Persians. They belong to the Faili tribe located originally in the border area. The expulsions form part of the Govern-

ment's present anti-Kurdish campaign.

The Kurdish leadership insists that it should at least be consulted over the citizenship of the Failis, many of whom were born in Iraq or have lived most of their lives there.


One diplomat recalled that his Faili servant, who had been in the country since 1917, had his residential permit torn up before his eyes, and was given three days to get to the frontier with his family.

Whatever Iraq's motives are, they can only exacerbate that Persian nationalism which, with Britain's withdrawal from the Gulf, is coming aggressively into its own.

The Arabs, divided and preoccupied with Israel, are in no position to offer their powerful neighbour further opportunities to gratify it. On the Arab side of the Gulf they will realise this. There are thousands of Persians there too.

When Persian troops landed on the island of Tunb they dropped leaflets declaring: "People of Tunb, you should be proud because from today you belong to the 30 million people of our dear country of Iran. ... Long live the Shahanshah Aryamehr of great Iran."

The rulers of the Gulf sheikhdoms do not want Iran to take a similar protective interest in their Persians. That is, no doubt, why, after anti-Persian riots in protest against the seizure of the three islands, the first thing Sheikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi did was to call in the victims and give them compensation.





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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 002 OF 1 JANUARY INFO ROUTINE  
CAIRO, BEIRUT, BAHRAIN RES, KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY LETTER OF 30 DECEMBER TO EVANS: IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

1. THERE WAS IN FACT A FURTHER MASSIVE EXPULSION OF IRANIANS FROM IRAQ ON 29 DECEMBER, I.E. AFTER THE POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY HAD SPOKEN TO ME. THE SWISS AMBASSADOR (WHOSE GOVERNMENT LOOKS AFTER IRANIAN INTERESTS IN IRAQ), WAS SUMMONED BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON 30 DECEMBER ALONG WITH HIS EGYPTIAN, SYRIAN AND SAUDI COLLEAGUES SEMICOLON THE AFGHAN AND KUWAITI AMBASSADORS COULD NOT BE FOUND BUT WERE SUMMONED LATER. KHALATBARI TOLD THEM THAT ON 29 DECEMBER THE IRAQIS HAD BROUGHT SOME 30,000 IRANIANS TO THE FRONTIER IN ABOUT 900 BUSES AND TRUCKS. CONDITIONS WERE PITIFUL. TO THE SWISS AMBASSADOR ALONE KHALATBARI ADDED IN CONFIDENCE THAT HE HAD HAD A SLEEPLESS NIGHT WORRYING LEST THE IRAQIS FORCED THE REFUGEES OVER THE FRONTIER WITH SHOTS: THE IRANIAN POLICE AND ARMY MIGHT WELL HAVE RE-ACTED.

2. THERE IS NO INDICATION YET OF WHAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT INTENDS TO DO. ON 27 DECEMBER THE POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY ASKED THE SWISS AMBASSADOR TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS TO THE EXPULSIONS. AS A RESULT, AN IRC REPRESENTATIVE WILL ARRIVE IN IRAN SHORTLY, BUT THE SWISS AMBASSADOR IS NOT CLEAR WHAT HE CAN OR WILL DO EXCEPT TO REPORT ON THE STATE OF THE REFUGEES.

pk 3/1  
/3. MEANWHILE

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3. MEANWHILE THE PRESS CONTINUE WITH STORIES OF THE  
EXPULSIONS AND ALSO OF THE EMERGENCY ARRANGEMENTS FOR  
SCREENING AND RECEIVING THE REFUGEES (THERE ARE ALLEGED  
TO BE A NUMBER OF IRAQI AGENTS AMONG THEM). BOTH THIS  
MORNING'S ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAPERS CARRY EDITORIALS  
CASTIGATING THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL,  
PROBABLY INSPIRED, WRITES OF IRAQ'S 'DIRTY POLITICAL  
GAME', AND TORTURE 'REMINISCENT OF THE NAZIS', AND  
ADDS THAT, 'UNLESS THE RULERS OF BAGHDAD STOP THEIR  
CRUEL CAMPAIGN AGAINST A SECTION OF THEIR PUBLIC THEY  
WOULD (SIC) SOON BE FACING RISKS THAT THEY NEVER IMAGINED'.

MURRAY

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TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO 005 OF 3/1 INFO TEHRAN

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MIPT (NOT TO ALL) SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SPEECH;  
EXPULSION OF IRANIANS.

1. SADDAM SAID THAT THE RECENT EXPULSIONS OF IRANIANS AND OTHERS STEMMED FROM NO ' ' HOSTILE OR RACIALIST MOTIVES ' ' BUT WERE MERELY THE ASSERTION BY IRAQ OF ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DEPORT THOSE WHO HAD ENTERED THE COUNTRY ILLEGALLY. HE SAID THAT UNDER IRAQI AND INTERNATIONAL LAW THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO TAKE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST PEOPLE WHO HAD ENTERED THE COUNTRY UNLAWFULLY BUT HAD NOT DONE SO AND HAD CONTENTED ITSELF WITH DEPORTED THEM.

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TO PRIORITY F.C.O. TELNO 006 OF 3/1 INFO TEHRAN, BEIRUT,  
KUWAIT, BAHRAIN EMBASSY, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA AND SAVING  
TO TRIPOLI.

③  
MIPT (NOT TO ALL) SADDAM HUSSEIN'S SPEECH: GULF ISLANDS.

1. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE ATTITUDES OF THE ARAB  
GOVERNMENTS TOWARDS IRAN'S OCCUPATIONS OF THE ISLANDS, SADDAM  
SAID THAT SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS HAD ASSUMED "AN HONOURABLE  
STAND WORTHY OF ESTEEM WHILE OTHERS DID NOT CLEARLY DEFINE  
THEIR POSITIONS". HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IRAQ'S STAND  
HAD BEEN TAKEN AFTER "FULL APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT STAGE AND  
THE CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS THE CONDITIONS OF THE ARAB NATION.  
ALTHOUGH IRAQ'S STAND WAS IN ONE SENSE LESS THAN IT OUGHT TO  
HAVE BEEN (PRESUMABLY HE IS HERE REFERRING TO THE LACK OF ACTION)  
IT WAS MORE THAN MIGHT REASONABLE HAVE EXPECTED OF A COUNTRY.  
SUCH AS IRAQ WHO LACKED THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO OTHER ARAB  
STATES.

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*A further twist to the screw.*

*ME*

*M. Gault*

*6/1*

*P.W. BS* 5

B63. IRAQ TO PUNISH ILLEGAL ENTRANTS

(BAGHDAD RADIO) AN INTERIOR MINISTRY SPOKESMAN HAS STATED

A NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS WHO ENTERED IRAQ ILLEGALLY HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SENT AWAY. ALTHOUGH IRAQI LAWS STIPULATE SPECIAL PENALTIES FOR INFILTRATORS, THE GOVERNMENT HAS DISREGARDED THESE LAWS FOR SPECIAL HUMANE REASONS. THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT REFER THE INFILTRATORS TO COURTS BUT WAS SATISFIED TO SEND THEM BACK TO THEIR HOMELAND.

AS OF THIS DATE, WE WILL REFER ANYONE WHO ENTERS IRAQ ILLEGALLY TO SPECIAL COURTS TO RECEIVE LEGAL PUNISHMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

END BBC MON 22.53 VR KY 5:1

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 17 OF 7 JANUARY INFO ROUTINE

CAIRO, BEIRUT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN RES AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

ARBUTHNOTT'S LETTER OF 6 JANUARY TO SMITH NED:

EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. WHEN I SAW THE POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON 6 JANUARY HE TOOK WHAT IS CLEARLY THE ESTABLISHED LINE THAT IRAN WOULD KEEP A COOL HEAD AND REACT IN A CIVILISED WAY TO THE "BAATHIST INHUMANITIES". NEVERTHELESS, THE EXPULSIONS WERE CRIMINAL AND SOMETHING UNPRECEDENTED SINCE WORLD WAR II.

2. THE IRANIANS HAD PROTESTED STRONGLY THROUGH THE SWISS, AS PROTECTING POWER, RESERVING THE RIGHT TO CLAIM COMPENSATION. AS REGARDS INTERNATIONAL ACTION, AS WELL AS APPROACHING THE U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL AND DENOUNCING THE EXPULSIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS, IRAN WOULD RAISE THE MATTER AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION IN MARCH AND MEANWHILE WOULD INFORM ALL FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS THROUGH IRANIAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS. ANY ACT OF SYMPATHY BY FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS WOULD BE APPRECIATED IN IRAN.

3. I DID NOT PROBE THE LATTER REMARK LEST IT SHOULD LEAD TO A SPECIFIC REQUEST FOR HELP OR DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FROM HMG. HOWEVER, YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER SOME EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY SHOULD BE MADE TO THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR IN LONDON AT A SUITABLE OPPORTUNITY.

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*Mr. Smith*  
*Pl. consider*

*reply by letter on 14/1*  
*pub 14/1*

*along with*  
*UN (E+S) Dept -*  
*Mr. McLane. Sir. W.*  
*Luce and sympathetic notes*  
*to Mr. Asker on 4 Jan. 68*



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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 17 OF 7 JANUARY INFO ROUTINE  
CAIRO, BEIRUT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN RES AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 10 JAN 1972 NEQ 3/324/1
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ARBUTHNOTT'S LETTER OF 6 JANUARY TO SMITH NED:

EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. WHEN I SAW THE POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON 6 JANUARY HE TOOK WHAT IS CLEARLY THE ESTABLISHED LINE THAT IRAN WOULD KEEP A COOL HEAD AND REACT IN A CIVILISED WAY TO THE 'BAATHIST INHUMANITIES'. NEVERTHELESS, THE EXPULSIONS WERE CRIMINAL AND SOMETHING UNPRECEDENTED SINCE WORLD WAR II.

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*replied by letter 14/1*

*pub 19/1*

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TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 19 OF 9 JANUARY INFO UKMIS GENEVA,  
UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 17 (NOT TO GENEVA): EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. MR STANLEY MITTON OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES CAME TO SEE US ON 8 DECEMBER. HE EXPLAINED THAT ,FOLLOWING THE IRANIAN TELEGRAM ASKING FOR AID(PARAGRAPH 8 OF ARBUTHNOTT'S LETTER OF 6 JANURAY TO SMITH,NED) WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO HIS ORGANISATION, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS AND THE LEAGUE OF RED CROSS SOCIETIES, THE THREE ORGANISATIONS HAD AGREED THAT HE SHOULD GO TO IRAN TO REVIEW THE SITUATION.
2. ALL THREE HAD CONSIDERABLE RESERVATIONS ABOUT OFFERING AID FOR THE IRAQI REFUGEES. THEY SUSPECTED THAT THE RED LION AND SUN SOCIETY WAS ITSELF QUITE CAPABLE OF DEALING WITH THE SITUATION,AND THAT APPEALS FOR INTERNATIONAL AID WERE INTENDED TO PROCURE SUPPORT FOR THE IRANIAN POLITCAL CAUSE. THE ORGANISATIONS ALSO FEARED THAT ANY APPEAL WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO MEET WITH MUCH SUCCESS.IRAN WOULD BE ASSOCIATED IN PEOPLESS MINDS WITH THE LAVISH EXPENDITURE ON THE OCTOBER CELEBRATIONS, AND THERE WOULD BE A GENERAL FEELING THAT THERE WAS NO NEED TO DONATE ANYTHING. IF ,THE APPEAL WAS A FAILURE, THIS WOULD ALSO PREJUDICE ANY FUTURE APPEALS FOR HELP TO IRAN IN THE EVENT OF ANOTHER EARTHQUAKE. THE ORGANISATIONS WERE ALSO NOT KEEN THAT RESOURCES SHOULD BE DIVERTED FROM THE PRESENT MAJOR PROBLEM OF RE-SETTLING THE 10 MILLION BENGALI REFUGEES.

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3. WE TOLD MITTON THAT WE AGREED WITH HIS ASSESSMENT, AND ADVISED HIM IF POSSIBLE NOT (REPEAT NOT) TO GO DOWN TO THE BORDER AREAS. ANY VISIT WOULD ATTRACT PUBLICITY AND RAISE HOPES WHICH MIGHT NOT BE FULFILLED.

4. MITTON ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS ON A STATEMENT. WE SUGGESTED THAT IF HIS ORGANISATION WERE TO ISSUE ONE, IT WOULD BE BEST TO SAY THAT HE HAD COME FOR CONSULTATIONS AT THE REQUEST OF THE RED LION AND SUN SOCIETY: HE HAD FOUND THAT THEY WERE COPING SPLENDIDLY WITH THE SITUATION, THE BACK OF THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN BROKEN, AND THAT HAPPILY THERE APPEARED TO BE NO NEED TO LAUNCH AN INTERNATIONAL APPEAL: HIS ORGANISATION WAS PREPARED FOR FURTHER CONSULTATIONS SHOULD THE NEED ARISE. MITTON SAID THAT THIS WAS VERY MUCH THE LINE HE HAD IN MIND.

5. MITTON ALSO TOLD US THAT ROBERT TISSOT

OF THE ICRC WAS CALLING AT TEHRAN ON 10 JANUARY ON HIS WAY TO DACCA AND THEY WOULD CONSULT TOGETHER ON THE LINE THE THREE ORGANISATIONS SHOULD TAKE. HE PROMISED TO LET US KNOW THE RESULT OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE IRANIANS.

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/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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British Embassy  
Tehran

*copied to Ellis (UN EPS)*

*replied by letter on 14/1*

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B Smith Esq  
NED  
FCO

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REGISTRY No. 10  
10 JAN 1972

NEQ 3/324/1

Your reference

Our reference

3/1

Date

6 January 1972

*Dear Brian,*

#### EXPULSIONS OF IRANIANS FROM IRAQ

Since Donald<sup>(2)</sup> Murray's letter of 30 December to Evans, and our telegram No 2 of 1 January, the Iranians driven out of Iraq have continued to preoccupy the Iranian Government. The Minister of Information, Mohammed Sam, has been down to the border area to oversee the arrangements being made available to the refugees, and the Prime Minister's Office has announced that Hoveyda has personally taken charge of administering the situation. As you will know from Washington telegram No 19, the ostensible reason for Hoveyda's cancellation of his visit to the US was given here as the deterioration in Irano/Iraqi relations. Political commentators regarded this as "highly significant". Finally the Shah and the Empress visited the border areas on 5 January (see para 7 below).

2. Meanwhile, it seems that the flow of refugees from Iraq has lessened to a trickle after the main bulk arrived at the border on 29 December. But the security authorities are only able to process about 800 a day. Assuming that they have been working at this rate since 30 December, and assuming that about 45,000 have recently been expelled (as the American Embassy believes), there are still at least 40,000 people who must be temporarily accommodated, fed and clothed. There could of course be more to come if the Iraqis decide to turn the heat on again; of 1.8 million Iraqi residents of Iranian origin, there were about 200,000 before the expulsions began about 2 years ago, who were not nationalised Iraqis, nor were born in Iraq, nor had married into Iraqi families. Of that 200,000, about 90,000 must now have been expelled during the past 2 years.

3. All this is something of a handful for the Iranians. The Indian Embassy, talking to us, have suggested that the Iranians are only now beginning to realise what it was like to handle 10 million Bengalis. As we reported in paragraph 2 of our telegram No 2, International Red Cross representatives have been invited to come to Iran, and are expected this week. They have not yet arrived. Two appeal funds have been set up, one for financial and one for aid in kind. The Empress has donated 2 million Rials and the Imperial Children, 200 blankets. Government employees in some ministries are reported to have offered to forego a day's salary to donate to the fund.



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4. What will the Iranians do next? In paragraph 3 of our telegram under reference, we quoted a passage from an editorial in Kayhan International, probably inspired, which was not the only one to threaten reprisals against the Ba'athists. The Iranian Government has been attempting for the past few days, by drawing attention to the situation, to rally support for its cause. It has particularly concentrated on moderate Arab capitals, among which it would now number Cairo, in the hope that the Iraqis will be condemned by their fellow Arabs. But I imagine that the Iranians would be over-optimistic to assume that the Irano/Egyptian detente has gone as far as this. There have also been suggestions that the Iranians may attempt to raise the expulsions in the Security Council; Fereidun Hoveyda is said to have seen the Secretary-General and advised Security Council members of the situation. But fear of Iraq resurrecting the islands problem in the UN could probably inhibit the Iranians from making too much of the matter there.

5. Apart from overt attempts to rally international support, the Iranians must be thinking carefully about the most effective ways of sponsoring subversive anti-Iraqi elements in a renewed attempt to oust the Ba'athist Government. A Reuter report from Beirut mentioned the formation of a National Iraqi Group, said to be aiming to overthrow the regime. This sounds like SAVAK hard at work. Above all they must be thinking about their Kurdish policy. If MacRae, in his letter of 26 November to Miss Becket, was right in supposing that relations between the Baghdad Government and the Kurds are entering another stormy phase following the attempted assassination of Barzani, the chances of promoting another Iraq/Kurdish war may be quite bright. But as Research Department suggested in their memorandum of 6 December on the Kurdish problem, the Iranians do not have Barzani in their pocket, and any success in that field must depend on Barzani's own assessment of the chances of improving his position by reverting to all out opposition against the Ba'athists.

What an absurd speculation. ✓  
6. Is there a chance of an Irano/Iraqi war? On 4 January six Iranians are alleged to have been killed when Iraqi police opened fire on a group of protesting deportees. There is always a chance of this sort of incident leading to firing across the border and serious escalation before either side really know what is happening (this was Khalatbari's worry). But from the Iranian angle, a deliberate decision to go to war looks no more likely now than it has in the recent past. The whole emphasis of Iranian foreign policy at present is on Iran's peaceful and humane policies, and it is on the grounds that Iran would never be so dastardly as to do to Iraqis what Iraq is now doing to her citizens, that Iran is appealing to the international community for support. The risks of being branded aggressor, with all the implications, are too great. But if the Iraqis carry on with their present campaign, and if the other methods mentioned of bringing pressure to bear on the Iraqis have no effect, the Shah might be tempted to think again. On the other hand he might reflect, as Balfour-Paul did in his valedictory despatch, that the deposition of the present regime might lead to something worse.



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7. Since writing the above, we have seen reports of an "impromptu" press conference given by the Shah during his visit to the border area. What he said bears out the preceding paragraph. He deplored the expulsions and warned that Baghdad "must be careful not to go beyond certain limits", but he added that "a country which is sure of itself and strong must always have forbearance". Referring to the screening of the refugees, he said that 300 suspected Iraqi spies had been caught, would be tried, and executed if convicted.

8. The Shah also made a rather petulant reference to the Western world's indifferent attitude to the refugees. He seemed to assume that an international appeal for aid had been issued. Unless you have received something from the Iranian Embassy we do not know of such an appeal, except from a press report of a telegram that the Red Lion and Sun Society sent to the International Red Cross asking for an appeal to be issued. The Shah said "The West has always been pro social dictatorship ... otherwise the Western world would have already extended every kind of help and they would even have raised funds by now". Can you let us know by telegram whether the British Red Cross has been approached by the IRC and, if so, how the BRC is reacting?

*Yuen*  
*Hyg.*

H J Arbuthnott

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 JAN 1972 NEQ 3/324/1
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 26 OF 10 JANUARY INFO PRIORITY  
CAIRO, BEIRUT, MOSCOW, BAHRAIN RES, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON.

<sup>N</sup><sub>R</sub>  
MY LETTER OF 30 DECEMBER TO EVANS (NOT TO WASHINGTON),  
PARA 5: IRAN/IRAQ

*replies included in  
tel re audience  
with Shah  
paid  
14/1*

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING (ALMOST CERTAINLY ON THE SHAH'S INSTRUCTIONS) TO VOICE CONCERN ONCE AGAIN ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON 17 DECEMBER AFTER GRECHKO'S VISIT SEEMED TO BE SIGNIFICANT: IT INCLUDED PHRASEOLOGY SUGGESTING A TOTAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THEN ON THE OCCASION OF IRAQI ARMY DAY ON 6 JANUARY GRECHKO HAD SENT A TELEGRAM TO HIS IRAQI OPPOSITE NUMBER EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO ARMED FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND CONSOLIDATE. THE IRANIANS WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS SOME NEW SOVIET/IRAQI AGREEMENT ON MILITARY COOPERATION AND WHETHER THE MESSAGE STEMMED FROM THIS. IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAD ALREADY REPORTED A RUSSIAN PRESENCE AT BASRA AND UMM QASR. ALSO AN IRAQI/SOVIET AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED ON 7 JANUARY FOR THE SUPPLY OF RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY. ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE DISQUIETING AND KHALATBARI WOULD WELCOME OUR ASSESSMENT.

2. I SAID THAT BEING, LIKE THE IRANIANS, WITHOUT A DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN IRAQ OUR SOURCES WERE AS LIMITED AS THEIRS. I HAD NOTHING FURTHER TO ADD TO WHAT I HAD SAID TO THE POLITICAL UNDER-SECRETARY ON 29 DECEMBER (WHEN I DREW ON PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM NO 761). PUTTING THE BEST INTERPRETATION ON THE GRECHKO TELEGRAM,

(55) NEQ 2/2  
(1478)

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IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN NO MORE THAN A DIPLOMATIC COURTESY ( I NOW SEE THAT IT REFLECTS SOME OF THE WORDING OF THE 17 DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE). LIKEWISE, THE SUPPLY OF OIL EQUIPMENT COULD BE A LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE IRAQI/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE NORTH RUMAILIA OIL FIELD. AFTER ALL, THE RUSSIANS HAD SOLD MUCH MILITARY AND CIVIL EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AND NO ONE ARGUED THAT THESE WERE MORE THAN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS. KHALATBARI TOOK THE POINT BUT PRESSED FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

3. NOTHING IS GOING TO STOP THE SHAH OR HIS MINISTERS RAISING IRAQ WITH US AND DISCUSSING SOVIET ACTIVITIES THERE: IT IS ON THE TOP OF THEIR MINDS AT PRESENT. MOREOVER, THE SHAH WILL BE EXPECTING TO PURSUE POLITICAL DIALOGUES WITH US TO AN INCREASING EXTENT, PARTICULARLY AFTER HE RECEIVES THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 12. IF WE ARE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT INDIAN OCEAN PROBLEMS, INEVITABLY INVOLVING SOVIET THREAT, HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND IF WE SHOW OURSELVES RELUCTANT TO PURSUE A DIALOGUE RELATING TO THE SOVIET THREAT ON HIS OTHER BORDER. AT WORST, HE MIGHT EVEN REVIVE HIS SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE IN SOME WAY PRO-BAATHIST. SEEN FROM HERE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO BE FORTHCOMING AND TO GIVE KHALATBARI A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MAY NOW BE SEEKING TO INFLUENCE THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. IF OUR ASSESSMENT IS LESS ALARMIST THAN THE IRANIANS, AND WOULD THEREBY CALM SOME OF THEIR FEARS, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

MURRAY.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Reference

W9

Mr. ~~Hylse~~ EESD.

9

Soviet/Iraqi Relations. Tehran Telno 26 of 10 January.

*on the basis of the evidence*

We spoke. There appears to be little ground for Iranian fears of a new, closer relationship between Iraq and the Soviet Union. It is common practice for the Soviet Defence Minister to send messages of congratulation to his opposite numbers on the occasion of Armed Forces Days. (This practice is, however, restricted to those states with which the Soviet Union has good relations or to which she supplies military aid).

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REGISTRY No. 11  
13 JAN 1972

NEQ 3/324/1

2. Grechko's message of 6 January is almost identical to the one he sent in 1971. Both express the hope that the "friendly relations" between the armed forces of Iraq and the Soviet Union "will be further developed and strengthened". The only difference in tone is that Grechko signs the 1972 message "with respect" but this is only natural in the light of his recent visit to the country. The communique issued at the end of his visit contains nothing of note and is along standard lines.

3. The 7 January agreement on the supply of oil field equipment is almost certainly part of the continuing Soviet interest in the North Rumailia deposits.

11 January 1972.

*R. S. Reeve*  
R. S. Reeve.  
Soviet Section RD

*I agree with the above, which may be of use if you are thinking of replying.*

*W. Smith* NED.

DD 896639-110609 500M 7/71 GM 3643/2

OVER



Miss Beckett 12/1

Mr. Egerton

Useful for our eventual reply. But this will presumably await the result of Mr. Egerton's meeting of 11 January.

12/1

~~Miss Beckett~~ 12/1

~~Mr. Smith~~

} for joint  
2H reply to  
Tehran Tel

See from 14/1

no 26, AT,

15/1

passed to

Mr. Godber's summary  
today to Mr. Azhar (see record  
when available) on basis

to coordinate exchange on  
Iraq.

2. We cannot give the  
Iranian special assessments, but we  
be glad to exchange news on Soviet place in Iraq from time to time.



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FM TEHRAN 101245Z

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 26 OF 10 JANUARY INFO PRIORITY

CAIRO, BEIRUT, MOSCOW, BAHRAIN RES, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON.

MY LETTER OF 30 DECEMBER TO EVANS (NOT TO WASHINGTON),

PARA 5: IRAN/IRAQ

THE FOREIGN MINISTER SUMMONED ME THIS MORNING (ALMOST CERTAINLY ON THE SHAH'S INSTRUCTIONS) TO VOICE CONCERN ONCE AGAIN ABOUT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ. THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON 17 DECEMBER AFTER GRECHKO'S VISIT SEEMED TO BE SIGNIFICANT ; IT INCLUDED PHRASEOLOGY SUGGESTING A TOTAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. THEN ON THE OCCASION OF IRAQI ARMY DAY ON 6 JANUARY GRECHKO HAD SENT A TELEGRAM TO HIS IRAQI OPPOSITE NUMBER EXPRESSING THE HOPE THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO ARMED FORCES WOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP AND CONSOLIDATE. THE IRANIANS WONDERED WHETHER THERE WAS SOME NEW SOVIET/IRAQI AGREEMENT ON MILITARY COOPERATION AND WHETHER THE MESSAGE STEMMED FROM THIS. IRANIAN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES HAD ALREADY REPORTED A RUSSIAN PRESENCE AT BASRA AND UMM QASR. ALSO AN IRAQI/SOVIET AGREEMENT HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED ON 7 JANUARY FOR THE SUPPLY OF RUSSIAN EQUIPMENT FOR THE OIL INDUSTRY. ALL THESE DEVELOPMENTS WERE DISQUIETING AND KHALATBARI WOULD WELCOME OUR ASSESSMENT.

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➔ Mr Egeyton  
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IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN NO MORE THAN A DIPLOMATIC COURTESY ( I NOW SEE THAT IT REFLECTS SOME OF THE WORDING OF THE 17 DECEMBER COMMUNIQUE). LIKEWISE, THE SUPPLY OF OIL EQUIPMENT COULD BE A LOGICAL DEVELOPMENT FROM THE IRAQI/SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE NORTH RUMAILIA OIL FIELD. AFTER ALL, THE RUSSIANS HAD SOLD MUCH MILITARY AND CIVIL EQUIPMENT TO IRAN AND NO ONE ARGUED THAT THESE WERE MORE THAN COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS. KHALATBARI TOOK THE POINT BUT PRESSED FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

3. NOTHING IS GOING TO STOP THE SHAH OR HIS MINISTERS RAISING IRAQ WITH US AND DISCUSSING SOVIET ACTIVITIES THERE. IT IS ON THE TOP OF THEIR MINDS AT PRESENT.

MOREOVER, THE SHAH WILL BE EXPECTING TO PURSUE POLITICAL DIALOGUES WITH US TO AN INCREASING EXTENT, PARTICULARLY AFTER HE RECEIVES THE MESSAGE IN YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 12. IF WE ARE PREPARED TO TALK ABOUT INDIAN OCEAN PROBLEMS, INEVITABLY INVOLVING SOVIET THREAT, HE WILL NOT UNDERSTAND IF WE SHOW OURSELVES RELUCTANT TO PURSUE A DIALOGUE RELATING TO THE SOVIET THREAT ON HIS OTHER BORDER. AT WORST, HE MIGHT EVEN REVIVE HIS SUSPICIONS THAT WE ARE IN SOME WAY PRO-BAATHIST. SEEN FROM HERE IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO BE FORTHCOMING AND TO GIVE KHALATBARI A CONSIDERED ASSESSMENT OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION MAY NOW BE SEEKING TO INFLUENCE THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. IF OUR ASSESSMENT IS LESS ALARMIST THAN THE IRANIANS, AND WOULD THEREBY CALM SOME OF THEIR FEARS, SO MUCH THE BETTER.

There is no reason why the Shah should tell us about this. We may have no information to give him but we should certainly be ready to defend. J.H.

MURRAY.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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*I am inclined to agree with this.*

*AM !!*

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 26 OF 10 JANUARY INFO PRIORITY

*M. Epstein*

CAIRO, BEIRUT, MOSCOW, BAHRAIN RES, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON.

MY LETTER OF 30 DECEMBER TO EVANS (NOT TO WASHINGTON),  
PARA 5: IRAN/IRAQ.

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MURRAY.

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 29 11 JANUARY INFO ROUTINE CAIRO, BEIRUT, MOSCOW, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT AND WASHINGTON.

(9)

NY TELEGRAM NO 26 : IRAN/IRAQ

THE FOREIGN MINISTER LATER SPOKE IN ROUGHLY SIMILAR TERMS TO THE US AMBASSADOR, EXCEPT THAT HE ALSO MENTIONED TO MACARTHUR A RECENT DELIVERY TO IRAQ OF 25 MIG 21 AIRCRAFT. HOWEVER, FROM WHAT MY US COLLEAGUE SAID, I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT KHALATBARI SPOKE TO MACARTHUR "FOR INFORMATION ONLY", WHILE HE IS CLEARLY HOPING FOR A DIALOGUE WITH US.

MURRAY.

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12 JAN 1972  
NEQ 3/324/1

British Embassy,

Tehran.

30 December, 1971.

3/2

R.M. Evans, Esq.,  
NED,  
FCO.

*1 will refer  
in para 6.*  
*12/1*

*Mr. Egeydon.  
Mrs. Bennett.  
12/1*

*Dear Richard,*

Iran/Iraq Relations

*Reply. R.E.  
R.E. 14/1.*

After I had finished talking yesterday with Zelli, Political Under-Secretary at the Foreign Ministry, about Ras al-Khaimah (my telegram No. 1144), we had a general tour d'horizon during which I asked him whether Iraq had been expelling any more Iranians lately.

*NBT 4/10*

*19  
NEQ 3/324/1  
(1971)*

2. This brought forth a heated dissertation from Zelli on the iniquities of the Iraqi Government. The total of expulsions in the last three and a half months had risen to 24,000 (cf the figure of 11,000 quoted in Kuwait telegram No. 502, which was the figure used in the Iranian Note to the United Nations of 2 November). Moreover, of this figure, some 4,000 people had been expelled in the last two or three days. The Iraqi Security Services were being increasingly punitive; and a new feature which was causing great concern in Tehran was that there were numerous arrests and round-ups in the streets, and those detained were shipped straight off to the frontier without being allowed to contact their families. Over 700 men had been shipped direct to the frontiers in this way without their families. Houses vacated by expelled Iranians had been pillaged. Moreover, a number of refugees had said they had been tortured; their complaints were being investigated. The Iranian authorities were working hard to cope with this new influx of refugees, who were being moved into a camp in Giroft (in south-eastern Iran). The refugees had lost everything but they would be completely absorbed into the national life in Iran.

3. Zelli added that the Iranian Government was already in contact with the International Red Cross, but when I asked him what they wanted the IRC to do, he became vague and murmured about investigating the situation.

4. Today's local press report the recent expulsions in large headlines. KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL quotes an official spokesman as saying that more than 40,000 people have been expelled in the last four days, 30,000 of them on 29 December. The press has also described the pitiful conditions in sub-zero temperatures at the frontier. The figures given in

*my  
12/1*

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- 2 -

the press are so much higher than those quoted by Zelli, that I checked this morning with Mirfakhrai of the Third Political Department, who took the record of my talk with Zelli. He said I should take Zelli's figures as accurate; but I suspect that there was a further large influx yesterday which Zelli did not know about.

5. After we had talked about the refugees, Zelli asked if I had any information on Grechko's visit to Iraq. He also indicated that he was aware of the Shah's earlier worries about Iraq (Tehran telegram No. 1092), and, in general terms, of Alam's talk with the Ambassador. I therefore thought it advisable to draw on paragraph 2 of FCO telegram No. 761. I made all the points with the exception of the references to India (in brackets in paragraph 2 (a)). Zelli commented that all this fitted in with his own assessments; though on the Iraq National Charter, he wondered whether the Iraqi Communists really had got a new deal. The Ba'athists would clearly retain overall control in the Union.

6. As we had got on to the subject of the Russians, I mentioned Alam's earlier inquiry about whether Russia had been supporting India by flights from or through Iraq, and said we had no information on this (FCO telegram No. 763). Zelli undertook to pass this on to Alam. His only comment was that the Russians might have mounted flights from Egyptian territory. Reverting to Iraq, he said he had noted with interest the departure of an important Iraqi delegation to Peking. I said I had seen nothing of this. Have you?

*Yours ever*

*Donald*

(D.F. Murray)

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*See  
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copied  
to Tehran.  
JP*

(55)

(NEQ 2/2  
1971)

(58)

*Yes.*



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British Embassy  
Tehran



12

B Smith Esq  
NED  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 11 January 1972

Dear Brian,

EXPULSIONS OF IRANIANS FROM IRAQ

Since Arbuthnott's letter of 6 January and subsequent telegrams (not to all) no more refugees have come over the border. But the Iranians are still faced with the problem of where to put them. After the latest visit by Minister of Interior Sam to the border areas, the Ministry have come up with the bright idea of establishing a new town near Zahedan to accommodate the refugees. Some may also be moved to Zahedan itself, and if any more room is needed, to Mazanderan. The refugees may not take too kindly to being dumped in the poorest and least developed part of Iran, ~~presumably to act as a much needed labour pool.~~

2. The halting of the expulsions from Iraq has been widely ascribed to a Soviet protest to the Iraqi Government. We are not of course able to confirm the authenticity of this; it sounds like Persian wishful thinking. There has also been a report that Cologne Radio has broadcast a formal statement by the Tudeh Party, condemning the Iraqi action.

3. In paragraph 4 of Arbuthnott's letter under reference, we reported that Feridun Hoveyda had seen the Secretary General of the UN. Donald Murray has now heard from Esfandiari, Head of the International Department of the MFA, that during the course of this interview, Hoveyda asked for a special representative of the Secretary General to be sent to Iran to investigate the situation. According to Esfandiari, Waldheim subsequently summoned the Iraqi representative who pleaded lack of instructions (not unlikely). There has subsequently been no sign of any UN representative in Tehran.

4. In our telegram No 19 of 9 January, we said that Stanley Mitton, the representative of the World Council of Churches, would let us know the outcome of his discussions in Tehran. He told us yesterday that any aid given to the refugees would be donated by the Tehran religious community, who are meeting on Thursday to consider the problem, and would not have an international aspect. Neither he nor any other of the



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Geneva-based organisations would be making a statement, but it was possible that they would help out the Tehran religious community by a small donation on a purely informal basis and without any publicity. He did not go down to the border area. The position on aid for the refugees is now clear, but we would still be interested in your comments on paragraph 3 of our telegram No 17. (b)

5. You have no doubt seen reports of Khalatbari's interview with the New York Times, in which he said a per-peg the expulsions that Iran had no intention of taking the matter to the Security Council because in his opinion the peace of the region was not threatened. But he went on to say that Iran had asked the UN Human Rights Commission to place the matter on its agenda. He added that the fact that the Shah had visited Pakistan, showed that the Irano/Iraqi crisis was "settling down".

Yours ever,  
Mike Browne

N W Browne

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13



Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London SW1

Telephone 01-

H J Arbuthnott, Esq  
TEHRAN

Your reference

Our reference NEQ 3/548/1

Date 14 January 1972

EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter 3/1 of 6 January and your telegram no 17 of 7 January about the expulsion of Iranian citizens from Iraq. (6)

2. I am relieved to see that the heat has now gone out of this situation and that the flow of refugees from Iraq has dried up, though no doubt the Iraqi authorities will turn their attention to more unfortunates when their row with the Iranians flares up again.

3. I have checked with Hodgson of the British Red Cross who said that he has not so far received an appeal from the ICRC. He received a telegram of appeal from the Iranian Students Association and replied that the proper channel for such an appeal was through the Red Lion and Sun Society via the ICRC in Geneva; he would not therefore be surprised if an appeal were to materialise.

4. Hodgson said that the BRC response to any appeal would depend on how it was phrased and on what aid was sought. His preliminary reaction was that Iran and the RLSS were sufficiently wealthy to be able to meet the costs of this operation, which involved only their own citizens, out of their own resources. I see from paragraph 4 of Nick Browne's letter to me of 11 January that the bulk of the aid will now be donated by the Tehran Religious Community so that any appeal to the BRC would probably be for a token gesture at best. A token gesture would in any case presumably satisfy the Iranian desire for international sympathy for their case and we do not propose to try to push the BRC into being any more forthcoming. (12)

5. The "act of sympathy" mentioned in paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference is presumably our support for any action they may take in the Human Rights Commission. Although in principle we might be prepared to give such support, we cannot commit ourselves until we know the manner in which the Iranians intend to raise the matter. You should not take any initiative in raising this with the Iranians; if they approach you for support, however, you could speak on the lines of the preceding sentence, adding that we shall of course give their proposals sympathetic consideration.

Iranians

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/6.



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NEQ 3/548/1

14 January 1972

6. Sir William Luce has already made sympathetic noises to the Iranian Ambassador, when the latter called on him on 4 January. Mr Afshar also raised the question of Iraqi expulsions when he called on the Minister of State on 12 January. He did not however say anything new, nor did he ask for any specific support from us. Mr Godber also expressed sympathy with the plight of the refugees.

B Smith  
Near Eastern Department

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TO PRIORITY TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO. 24 OF 13 JANUARY.

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS.

now rep'd to Moscow

THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE MINISTER OF STATE ON 12 JANUARY TO EXPRESS HIS GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN ABOUT THE APPARENTLY INCREASING DEGREE OF RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ, AND PARTICULARLY THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES. AFSHAR SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE PROPOSING TO SUPPLY IRAQ WITH FURTHER SOPHISTICATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF A KIND INVOLVING THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS. HE ASKED IF HMG HAD ANY INFORMATION ABOUT THIS, OR ABOUT THE POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT WITH IRAQ SIMILAR TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND EGYPT.

2. MR GODBER SAID THAT WHILE WE WERE WELL AWARE OF RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT IN IRAQ, WE HAD NO SPECIFIC EVIDENCE OF ANY MAJOR NEW DEVELOPMENTS. THE IRAQIS HAD APPROACHED US EARLY LAST YEAR ABOUT THE POSSIBLE SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BUT WE HAD NOT SUPPLIED THEM WITH ANY ARMS. THERE HAD FOR SOME TIME BEEN A NUMBER OF RUSSIAN TECHNICIANS IN IRAQ (PERHAPS ABOUT 500) BUT WE HAD NO EVIDENCE OF ANY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE. SINCE RELATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF LAST DECEMBER OUR COVERAGE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ IS BOUND TO CONTINUE TO WEAKEN, BUT WE SHOULD CERTAINLY BE READY TO PASS ON TO THE IRANIANS ANY NEW INFORMATION WE RECEIVED ABOUT ANY SUCH DEVELOPMENTS.

3. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION AFSHAR AGREED THAT THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES COULD NOT POSE ANY SERIOUS THREAT TO IRAN. BUT AN INCREASE IN THE DEGREE OF COLLABORATION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND IRAQ WOULD CAUSE VERY CONSIDERABLE CONCERN IN TEHRAN.

SEE MIFT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

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PS/MR GODBER

SIR W LUCE

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**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**  
**London SW1**

Telephone 01-

**D F Murray Esq**

**TEHRAN**

Your reference

Our reference

NEQ 3/324/1

Date

14 January 1972

**IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS**

1. Many thanks for your letter of 30 December about your talk with Zelli.

2. We shall be convering part of the subject in our telegram of guidance for the Ambassador's audience with the Shah. You will now have seen Lewty's letter of 22 December to Veronica Beckett and Baghdad telegram no 15 (neither to all) about the Iraqi delegation which recently visited China. There is not much comfort for the Iranians (or for us) in what Samarraie said at the airport on his return.

**R M Evans**  
**Near Eastern Department**

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BAGHDAD PRESS EXTRACTS

(16)

Sunday and Monday - January 9 and 10, 1972.

EDITORIALS:

Sunday:


Al-Thawra:

Carries no editorial.

Monday:

Al-Jumhuriyah:

In the column "In the Target" Abu Hadaf comments on the reasons given by America to justify its recent Phantom deal to Israel. The writer describes these reasons as ridiculous excuses. He adds that this deal is in fact aimed at challenging and threatening the Arabs to move closer on the way of surrender. He concludes by saying that the deals of Phantoms or any other arms given to Israel for any reason should not be taken as a measure to determine Arabs attitude towards America. American Imperialism and the fact that Israel is America and America is Israel are the only measures to depend on in determining Arabs' attitude.



Al-Thawra:

Carries a long editorial dealing with the recent deportation of Iranians from Iraq. The writer says that the Government of Iran is nowadays engaged in creating a big commotion over the deportation measures taken by Iraq against Iranians who had entered Iraq by illegal means. He says that these measures are a part of Iraq's sovereignty over its territory.

The writer bitterly criticises the Shah's aggressive policy towards Iraq and towards the people of Iran. The writer says that the Shah, instead of shedding crocodile tears over the Iranians deported from Iraq, should provide them with jobs and sources of living in their own country so that they will not be compelled to search for it elsewhere.

Al-Taakhi:

Carries no editorial.

NEWS ITEMS:

Sunday:

Al-Thawra:

Dr. Sa'dun Hammadi, Minister of Oil and Minerals, left yesterday for Geneva, to take part in the negotiation which will take place there on Monday (to-day) between OPEC and the World Oil Companies.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 52 OF 19 JANUARY INFO ROUTINE

BAGHDAD, BA<sup>H</sup>RAIN RES, CAIRO, BEIRUT, KUWAIT.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
20 JAN 1972

NEQ 3/324/1

FCO TEL NO 24 (TEHRAN ONLY) AND OUR TEL NO 36: <sup>(14)</sup> <sup>(2) NEQ 1/1</sup>

IRANO/IRAQI RELATIONS AND THE KURDS.

1. TODAY'S PAPERS ALLEGE THAT RADIO BAGHDAD HAS SAID THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT INTEND TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN IRAN. "THE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME OF IRAQ WILL CONTINUE TO REMAIN A THORN IN THE EYES OF THE IRANIAN REACTIONARIES AND THEIR IMPERIALIST MASTERS. THE IRAQI REVOLUTION WILL CONTINUE TO WELCOME AND EMBRACE THOSE ENGAGED IN ANIT-IRANIAN ACTIVITIES".

2. THE REPORT GOES ON TO QUOTE NEWS ALLEGEDLY BROADCAST BY A KURDISH STATION. THE KURDISH STATION CLAIMED THAT AN IRAQI ILYUSHIN PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN BY KURDISH REBELS, AND THAT A SERIES OF HARD BATTLES HAD TAKEN PLACE AROUND THE AREAS MENTIONED IN OUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. THE RADIO FURTHER CLAIMED THAT BARZANI WAS CONSIDERING TERMINATING THE 1971 AGREEMENT WITH BAGHDAD. THE REPORT COMMENTS THAT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME IN MANY MONTHS THAT A CLANDESTINE RADIO HAS BROADCAST ANTI-BA'ATH PROGRAMMES IN KURDISH.

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British Embassy  
Tehran

Enter  
Miss Beckett 25/1  
Mr. Egerton

18

Mr. Rundle (25) 27/1

We shall see in the  
spring how successful  
the Iranians have

B Smith Esq  
NED  
FCO

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO. 10  
24 JAN 1972

Your reference

Our reference

Date 20 January 1972

been in trying 3/1  
No "Launch Barzani"

Dear Sir,

IRANO-IRAQI RELATIONS

TEL 52  
17  
TEL 36  
NEQ 11 2  
In Hugh Arbuthnott's letter of 6 January, we speculated on Iran's future policy towards Iraq. You will know from our telegrams nos 36 and 52 that there have since been a number of reports of renewed Kurdish activity against the Iraqi Government. In the absence of any political reporting from Baghdad, we are not of course able to confirm this but it does suggest that we were right in supposing that the Iranians are in the process of once again trying to launch Barzani.

2. It has also been reported that the Iranians have sent what reads as a mild letter to Baghdad, via the Swiss Embassy, in which they are supposed to have told the Iraqis that if they must deport people of Iranian origin, it should be in accordance with "a well ordered programme". The Iranians' letter of protest to the UN Commission on Human Rights (para 5 of my letter of 11 January) was delivered on 18 January and upbraided the Iraqi Government for persistently violating the most elementary human rights and trampling on the universally-recognised principles of international law.

3. This is all that the Iranians are doing at the moment that has become public knowledge, and there has been criticism of Government inactivity in the press. You will soon see Kayhan International's piece of 19 January, headed "Time to Act". "For us to continue behaving towards the Baghdad Junta," it reads, "as if it were a government in the accepted sense of the term, would be quite unwise ... It should be told that enough is enough. Obviously we cannot debase ourselves and stoop as low as the Ba'ath Junta. And we are not saying that the Ba'ath should be repaid in its own currency. But there are many methods of making it clear to Baghdad that it could easily find itself in deep water if it does not change its ways ... It goes without saying that the Government should now speak up and tell us what it intends to do." We still do not have any further ideas about what, apart from inciting the Kurds, the press may have in mind.

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Probably nothing; although the Shah told the Ambassador this week that he was having difficulty in restraining the press, the authorities are probably content to let it continue a hard line, even though there may be nothing specific behind the threats.

*Wm. W. Browne*  
*[Signature]*

*[Signature]* N W Browne





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1/2

21 January 1972

Miss V E Beckett  
Near Eastern Department  
F C O

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 25 JAN 1972 NEQ 3/324/1
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6/1/72

Dear Veronica

IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS AND THE KURDS

1. The Baghdad Observer for 17 January published a short item under the banner headline "Iranian aggression foiled" about an attack by Iranian forces on an Iraqi police post at Al Ain in the Wasit Governorate. The Iranians were said to have suffered several casualties and lost a number of weapons. The Iraqis lost one dead and one wounded and took one Iranian prisoner. The following days paper had a photograph of the prisoner on its front page and two days later there was another photograph showing weapons captured.
2. Since then the Baghdad Observer has printed reports of the condemnation of the Iranian action by Kuwait, the two Yemens and Somalia and has also had pieces on its front page each day about various explosions, etc which had taken place in Tehran. There have also been various feature articles denouncing Iran, some on home ground and some re-printed from Kuwaiti magazines.
3. There has been no statement published here about the matters referred to in Tehran telno 52 of 19 January. — (17)

Yours ever

1 am

D I Lewty

c.c. Chanceries at:

TEHRAN, BAHRAIN EMBASSY, KUWAIT, CAIRO, BEIRUT

Mr Sykes 26/1  
Arabian Dept  
26/1, 27/1  
27/1



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FCO 983 E 26/25

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RR FCO

RR TEHRAN

RR KUWAIT

GR 76

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EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 250658Z

UNCLASSIFIED

TO ROUTINE F.C.O. TELNO 75 OF 25/1 INFO TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

MY LETTER 1/2 OF 21 JANUARY TO MISS BECKETT:  
IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS AND THE KURDS.

1. BOTH THE ARABIC AND ENGLISH PAPERS FOR THE  
LAST COUPLE OF DAYS HAVE CARRIED REPORTS OF FURTHER  
EXPLOSIONS IN IRAN AND EDITORIALS DECLARING THAT THE  
SHAH IS ON HIS LAST LEGS AND THAT HIS CURRENT "ACTS OF  
AGRESSION" ARE THE LAST DESPARATE ACTION OF A "WOUNDED  
BEAST".

LEWY.

The Shah will be Thrived.

Mr Egeston. O

Mr Smith.


Miss Beckett. 125/1

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FM BAGHDAD 250658Z

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TO ROUTINE F.C.O. TELNO 75 OF 25/1 INFO TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

MY LETTER 1/2 OF 21 JANUARY TO MISS BECKETT: (19)  
IRAQ/IRAN RELATIONS AND THE KURDS.

1. BOTH THE ARABIC AND ENGLISH PAPERS FOR THE  
LAST COUPLE OF DAYS HAVE CARRIED REPORTS OF FURTHER  
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AGGRESSION" ARE THE LAST DESPARATE ACTION OF A "WOUNDED  
BEAST".

LEWTY

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British Embassy  
Tehran

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
28 JAN 1972

NEP 3/324/1

B Smith Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO

Your reference

Our reference

Date 25 January 1972

Dear Brian,

#### IRAQI BORDER INCIDENT

You may have seen on 18 January reports of a border skirmish between Iranian and Iraqi Forces which originated from Baghdad Radio. The Deputy Minister of Information, Farhad Nikukhah, emphatically denied it. As you know, there are frequent rumours and denials of incidents of this nature, and we did not think it worth reporting at the time.

2. An official in charge of Middle East affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has since told a British journalist that this time the report was substantially correct, which means that there were at least some casualties and that an Iranian soldier might have been captured. The Shah subsequently told the Ambassador that the Iraqis had used a tank and quite strong forces.

3. There have been no reports of further incidents; I am sure that the Iranians would want to avoid them if possible.

Yours ever,  
Nick Browne  
N W Browne

① Miss Secker 1629,

② Pa

27/1

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Excerpt from Shah's press  
conference, 15 January 1972

Q: Could Your Majesty explain to us the way you see the current problem with Iraq?

A: Well, I don't know if we can call it a current problem since it is something to which we have almost become accustomed. We are serious. We are a country that thinks before taking any measure and we like our respectability. Facing us we have leaders that are, perhaps, not like that and who, finally, do not all follow the same ideas. To deport 60,000 people all of a sudden is a thing we would never do. Separating fathers from their children, men from their wives, is to us something extraordinary. You can see those people yourselves and ask them questions. The equilibrium is lost because we do not think in the same way. That sort of behaviour is beyond our conception because we shall never do a thing like that. One is put off a bit in the face of acts like that. Everyone believed that fascism was over in the world. We are exposed to acts that have the same consequences. But, once again, one should not lose one's sang froid. Our country is not going to change its mentality and methods because of such provocation. All the same, they should be careful because no one can go beyond a certain point in a policy of provocation. After a certain point those subjected to that policy will no longer tolerate it.

Q: Could you explain to us why the influx of deportees suddenly slowed down? Could one say this resulted from intervention by the Soviet Union?

A: Everything is possible.

Q: Did you demand Soviet intervention?

A: No, never. We informed our friends about the whole event. But we did not seek any direct intervention. Of course, we kept the world informed of the whole event.

Q: During our visit to one of the camps set up for the deportees we noticed that many of them were of Kurdish origin. To what extent would Your Majesty say the deportation of Iranians was connected with Iraq's domestic problems and its relations with Kurdish forces?

A: I don't think the two are connected at all. This is an entirely separate issue. Of course, since the Kurds are Aryans, and very pure Aryans too, one could see a racist angle in the event too in the sense that they took action against those people who are called Aryan. Otherwise, I don't think there was any direct relationship between the two issues.

Q: Your Majesty, do you think Iraq's aggressiveness indicates, prefigures, heralds a change of orientation in the policy of Arab states who might concentrate themselves on the Persian Gulf, abandoning, perhaps, Israel's region, etc...? What is your opinion?

A: Obviously, that would be easier since there would be less danger of war. The Iraqis — I mean the leaders since I do not wish to refer to the people of Iraq for whom we still have sentiments of friendship — do not, I believe, want their troops on the Israeli front so much, especially if they would have to fight. It is a bit early for replying to your question which, nevertheless, cannot be excluded. But let us wait for the formation of the new Egyptian government. So far the Egyptians have not behaved like that. Throughout what happened between us they have maintained friendly relations. But even though Iran today might not be considered a formidable military power I do not recommend anyone to try and meddle against us and that, especially, not in five years' time...

Q: There is a clear impression of Iran's reinforcement — of an Iran which is weighing more and more in a considerable way.

A: Yes, obviously. It is one of the factors that form the context of power politics. If all the weight of the United States behind Israel makes one hesitate to attempt anything over there, one might believe it possible to find a mere "nothing" elsewhere — perhaps to try and avenge oneself in another direction. But that would be something very dangerous to do. I believe that the consequences would be at least as dangerous, if not more so, since we, and the region that would be affected, are precisely the region that contains nearly 60 per cent of the world's oil resources.

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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 117 9 FEBRUARY INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, ROUTINE CAIRO, KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN RESIDENCY.

⑥  
MYTEL NO. 17 AND NEAR EASTERN DEPARTMENT'S LETTER (NEQ 3/548/1)<sup>324</sup> OF 14 JANUARY (NOT TO ALL): EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ. ⑥

1. THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN CHARGE OF U.N. AFFAIRS ASKED ME TO CALL THIS MORNING TO DISCUSS IRAN'S REQUEST TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION TO ACCEPT THE IRANIAN LETTER OF PROTEST FOR DISCUSSION AT ITS SESSION IN MARCH.

2. NAYYERI EXPLAINED THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN VERY RESTRAINED IN THEIR REACTIONS TO THESE CRUEL EXPULSIONS AND SIMILAR PROVOCATIONS BY IRAQ. NOR HAD THEY SOUGHT TO TAKE THE COMPLAINT TO ANY POLITICAL FORUM IN THE U.N. BUT THE IRAQIS, HAD DELIBERATELY VIOLATED THE MOST ELEMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS. THOUSANDS OF FAMILIES HAD BEEN SEPARATED FROM EACH OTHER AND CAUSED THE GREATEST DISTRESS. IT WAS ONLY RIGHT THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD BE RAISED NOW AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, MEETING ON 6 MARCH.

3. NAYYERI EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE IRANIAN DELEGATION, LED BY PRINCESS ASHRAF, WOULD BE ABLE TO COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THE BRITISH DELEGATION AS HAD BEEN DONE SO SUCCESSFULLY AT THE SECURITY COUNCIL LAST DECEMBER. THE IRANIANS WERE APPROACHING OTHER AMBASSADORS WHOSE GOVERNMENTS WERE REPRESENTED ON THE COMMISSION. MOST WERE BEING ASKED TO NOTIFY THEIR GOVERNMENTS OF THE IRANIAN POSITION, BUT IN THE CASE OF IRAN'S FRIENDS, SUCH AS THE BRITISH, THEY WERE ASKING FOR OUR POSITIVE SUPPORT. THEY ANTICIPATED THAT IRAQ WOULD TRY TO AVOID THE IRANIAN ITEM BEING INSCRIBED AND WOULD SEEK ARAB SUPPORT. THE IRANIANS HOPED, /HOWEVER,

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HOWEVER, THEY COULD COUNT ON THE BRITISH DELEGATION TO OPPOSE THIS AND TO FAVOUR THE INSCRIPTION OF THE ITEM. HE WOULD NOT, AT THIS STAGE, SAY WHAT THE IRANIAN LINE WOULD BE, ASSUMING THE ITEM WERE INSCRIBED. THEY WOULD PROBABLY ASK FOR PRIORITY FOR DISCUSSION AT THIS SESSION. BUT IRAN WOULD NOT BE LOOKING FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMISSION WHICH MIGHT BE EMBARRASSING TO THE BRITISH AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS. FROM HIS OWN EXPERIENCE, NAYYERI WOULD EXPECT THE COMMISSION TO MAKE SOME APPEAL TO BOTH THE IRAQI AND IRANIAN GOVERNMENTS, EQUALLY.

4. I SAID THAT I HAD ALREADY EXPRESSED TO THE SHAH MY ADMIRATION FOR THE MODERATION WITH WHICH HE HAD HANDLED THE EXPULSIONS. HMG HAD EXPRESSED THEIR SYMPATHY WITH THE PLIGHT OF THE REFUGEES (NAYYERI CONFIRMED THAT AFSHAR HAS SO REPORTED ON HIS CONVERSATION WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE ON 12 JANUARY). I HAD ALREADY ANTICIPATED THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST FOR OUR SUPPORT. I COULD SAY NOW THAT WE WOULD GIVE THE IRANIAN REQUEST OUR SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION. WE COULD NOT, OF COURSE, COMMIT OURSELVES TO GIVING SUPPORT IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BEFORE WE HAD LEARNED THE MANNER IN WHICH IRAN INTENDED TO RAISE THE MATTER. NAYYERI SEEMED QUITE SATISFIED WITH THIS RESPONSE.

5. THE IRANIANS WILL, I THINK, ATTACH PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE TO SECURING BRITISH SUPPORT. THEY WILL WANT TO WORK CLOSELY WITH OUR DELEGATION AND SEEK THEIR ADVICE ON TACTICS WHICH, AS NAYYERI SAID, THEY HAD FOUND SO VALUABLE IN NEW YORK. IF WE CAN OFFER THIS AND ALSO HELP THEM TO OBSTRUCT ANY IRAQI MOVE TO KEEP THEIR ITEM OFF THE AGENDA, I THINK THEY WILL BE SATISFIED.

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PRIORITY TO FCO TELNO 189 OF 9 FEBRUARY INFO PRIORITY TEHRAN  
ROUTINE TO CAIRO KUWAIT BAHRAIN RESIDENCY.

23

TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 117 TO FCO: EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

PLEASE SEE PARAGRAPHS 2-4 OF MISS REID'S LETTER 18/18/8 OF  
8 FEBRUARY TO ELLISON, UN (E AND S) DEPARTMENT (NOT TO ALL).

2. IRAN HAS ASKED FOR THE INSCRIPTION OF A SEPARATE ITEM ON THE  
AGENDA OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. THE IRANIAN MISSION HAVE  
ASKED US FOR SUPPORT ON BOTH THE INSCRIPTION AND SUBSTANCE. THEY  
THINK IT WOULD HELP TO HAVE A RESOLUTION CALLING ON IRAN AND IRAQ  
TO DISCUSS AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION. THEY APPARENTLY HOPE TO SECURE  
COMPENSATION. IRAQ IS LIKELY TO OPPOSE INSCRIPTION. THE ARAB GROUP  
HAVE NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER TO SUPPORT IRAQ IN THIS BUT WOULD  
PROBABLY DO SO (OTHER ARAB REPRESENTATIVES ON THE COMMISSION BEING  
EGYPT, LEBANON AND MOROCCO).

3. BOTH THE US AND NETHERLANDS MISSIONS' PRELIMINARY REACTION IS  
TO SUPPORT THE IRANIAN REQUEST FOR INSCRIPTION THOUGH THE US WONDER  
WHETHER IT SHOULD NOT BE AS A SUB-ITEM OF ITEM 10 (VIOLATION OF  
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS).

4. WE CONSIDER THAT WE SHOULD SUPPORT INSCRIPTION AND OPPOSE  
IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT IT. ORDINARILY WE WOULD WELCOME AN  
OPPORTUNITY TO OPPOSE IRAQ ON SUBSTANCE AS A DIVERSION FROM OTHER  
TOPICS ON THE AGENDA. FULL AND CLOSE ANGLO-IRANIAN CO-OPERATION ON  
THIS COULD HOWEVER ENCOURAGE IRAQ TO REVIVE THE ISSUE OF THE GULF  
ISLANDS, WHICH THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAS SHELVED, AND OTHER ARAB  
STATES WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO PLAY THIS DOWN. IT MAY BE WISER,  
THEREFORE, NOT TO TAKE A PROMINENT PART IN ARGUMENT ON SUBSTANCE.

JAMIESON

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*Mr. Evans has submitted on  
this page by*

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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 198 OF 10 FEBRUARY INFO ROUTINE TEHRAN  
INFO SAVING UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN.

24- MY TELNO 189: IRAQI EXPULSIONS.

KITTANI (ASSISTANT SECRETARY-GENERAL) TOLD US TODAY THAT AS A  
RESULT OF IRANIAN REPRESENTATIONS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAD  
DECIDED TO SEND AN OFFICIAL TO IRAQ AND IRAN. IRAQ MIGHT WELL  
BE RELUCTANT TO RECEIVE HIM BUT HE WAS LEAVING TODAY. HE IS  
HOMANN-HERIMBERG FROM UNHCR'S OFFICE HERE BUT HE WOULD NOT (NOT)  
ACT FOR UNHCR AS SUCH.

2. NO PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT HAS BEEN MADE.

FCO PASS SAVING UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN.

JAMIESON

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


(UN(E+S) Dept + NEQ)  
 Copy to FROH + Chancery,  
 Tehran 1/13/72  
 y.a.



HR 1072

PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ  
 TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
 14 EAST 79TH STREET  
 NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021



9/2

The Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representatives and Observers to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the Note circulated by the Permanent Representative of Iran on January 5, 1972.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq categorically rejects the baseless allegations contained in the Iranian note. The accusations levelled against the Iraqi authorities are so obvious and inconsistent that they are in fact self-defeating.

The nature of the problem of the Iranian nationals illegally residing in Iraq, and the measures taken by the Iraqi authorities to cope with that problem, have already been defined in a previous Iraqi note dated November 11, 1971. No State would tolerate the presence of illegal entrants nor would it extend residency or work permits to such foreigners. The deportation of any foreigner illegally residing in any country is the sovereign right of the government of that country; it is a purely internal



measure and is fully in accord with international law and practice. The Iraqi authorities, therefore, had every right to take legal action, including the imposition of fines and prison sentences against the illegal entrants. The Iranians illegally residing in Iraq, however, were neither fined nor thrown into gaols. They were granted the necessary facilities and escorted to the borders of their own country.

Since the Iranian Foreign Minister himself, as quoted in the New York Times of January 9, 1972, admitted that Iraq may have "had legal grounds" for the expulsion of the Iranian nationals, the Iranian government is desperately trying to mount a campaign of hostility against Iraq by resorting to a non-existent question of human rights. The deportation of Iranians illegally residing in Iraq is not a novel event. Because of the long boundary between Iraq and Iran and because of the Iranian authorities' refusal to shoulder their international responsibilities in controlling illegal traffic across the borders, Iraq has always been faced with the problem of large numbers of illegal Iranian immigrants who are drawn to Iraq for various reasons, the most important of which are the employment opportunities to be found in Iraq. The Iranian government, however, has made a habit of raising the question of the deportation of

Cont/.



Iranian nationals from Iraq wherever that government tries to divert world attention from its policies of aggression and other illegal actions towards Iraq and other Arab States in the Arabian Gulf.

The contradictions and glaring discrepancies which abound in the declarations made by the Iranian official sources expose the frailty of the Iranian allegations.

There are, for example, significant discrepancies in the number of those expelled from Iraq as reported by the Iranian press and official spokesmen, who finally seem to have settled for a number approximating 60,000 deported over a period of three and a half months; half of them are said to have been expelled, incredibly, in one night! The number of those deported on that single night had undergone a sharp decrease within three days, all according to information emanating from a single source; namely, the Permanent Representative of Iran. On January 4, he told a correspondent of The New York Times that the number was 36,000 (as quoted in The New York Times of January 5, 1972). In his note circulated also on January 5, the number mentioned by the Permanent Representative was 33,000; then in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on January 6, (contained in document E/CN.4/10092

Cont/.



dated January 11, 1972) the number is brought down to 30,000).

The following discrepancies are even more astonishing. The Iranian Permanent Representative in his Note of January 5, states that "almost 3,800 Iraqis including some non-commissioned officers of the Iraqi Army were secreted among Iranian expellees." The international edition of the Teheran daily "Kayhan" of January 8, on the other hand, quotes the Shah as follows: "the Monarch also told newsmen that 300 suspected Iraqi spies had infiltrated among the expellees. They will be tried and if convicted executed shortly. He also confirmed that some of them had explosives and arms when they were captured." "The Times" of London, of January 17th, reports from Teheran however that a group of 120 Iranians will go on trial before a military court on charges of espionage, sabotage and subversion. According to "The Times" a security spokesman "alleged at a press conference that the group arrested during the past five months, had been trained in Iraq and East Germany." The government of Iraq has officially and categorically rejected the allegation that there were Iraqi nationals among those deported to Iran. The attempt to implicate Iraqis in the whole affair is obviously devised to detract attention from the internal troubles the Iranian authorities are having

Cont/.



with their own nationals.

The Iranian pretext in raising the issue of human rights is neither valid nor relevant. The allegations of the "ill-treatment of the deportees" is denied by the "deportees" themselves - as reported in The New York Times of January 31, 1972.

As to the so-called "atrocities" listed in the Iranian note, they are utterly refuted by the very presence of Iranian residents in Iraq. Had the Iraqi authorities been really guilty of all the wild accusations contained in the notes circulated by the Permanent Representative of Iran; had the large Iranian community living in Iraq been as badly treated and abused over the years as the Iranian notes falsely claim, those Iranians would themselves have had left Iraq, long ago. Yet, it is the Iraqi government which is now being criticized for deporting them.

The Iranian authorities, on the other hand, are keeping their nationals in enclaves at the border posts looking for all the world like a concentration camp of tents, exploiting the inmates for propaganda purposes and, as may be gathered from the Shah's declarations quoted in "Kayhan" and the news item from "The Times" of London, for what appears to be an expedient way of dealing with Iranian dissidents. If

Cont/..



there were questions of human rights involved it would be more appropriate to call upon the Government of Iran to explain its actions. As far as Iraq is concerned, the question of the illegal immigrants is not humanitarian; it is a political, juridical and economic question directly related to the principle of sovereignty and the legitimate right of a State to safeguard its internal security.

Finally, the Permanent Representative of Iran in his note of January 5, states that he would like "to expose the hypocrisy and hollowness of the Iraqi pretensions as to its policy of good-neighbourliness." This statement must have been quite incomprehensible to anyone who read the note and was aware of the fact that Iraq had amply demonstrated, since 1969, its displeasure with the aggressive policies of the Iranian Government. The Government of Iraq had genuinely tried to improve the relations with Iran, but the Iranian Government responded by intensifying its hostile policy and increased its interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. The unilateral abrogation by the Iranian Government of the Iraqi - Iranian Boundary Treaty of 1937 and the subsequent Iranian attempts to engage in subversive activities inside Iraq led the Iraqi Government, in 1970, to the decision to demote its diplomatic representation in Teheran.

Cont/.



Iraq eventually severed all diplomatic relations with the Iranian Government last year upon Iran's armed aggression against, and occupation of, the three strategical Arab Islands in the Arabian Gulf.

It was the Iranian Government, and not Iraq, which unilaterally and illegally declared the valid and mutually binding "Boundary Treaty of 1937, between Iraq and Iran" as null and void. It was Iran who refused to refer the dispute over the Boundary Treaty to the International Court of Justice as Iraq had repeatedly offered. It was the Iranian policies of encroachment and aggression which have led to the deterioration of good-neighbourly relations, and now threaten peace and security in the area.

Iraq is by no means the only Arab country in the region which faces a large illegal influx of Iranian nationals annually. The people of Iraq have for centuries welcomed their Iranian neighbours, to whom they are bound with the closest historical and religious ties, granted them shelter and employment opportunities. The unmitigated hostility of the Iranian regime towards Iraq, which was demonstrated most recently by the incursion of Iranian armed units across the border into Iraq on January 15, 1972,

Cont/.



has made the Iraqi authorities extremely vigilant to all illegal crossings of Iraq - Iranian borders. The authorities, furthermore, had to investigate and to deport the illegal Iranian residents in Iraq. The presence of those Iranians became an intolerable security risk for Iraq because of the Iranian Government's hostile policies and aggressions against Iraq. The Iranian authorities' allegations concerning the so-called Iraqis "secreted" among those deported from Iraq, would actually enable the Iraqi authorities to make a far more valid counter-claim concerning Iranian agents who may be secreted among the large number of Iranians illegally entering Iraq every year.

The measures taken by the Iraqi authorities are in no way directed against Iran or the people of Iran. This has been reaffirmed as recently as January 14, by Mr. Saddam Hussain, Deputy Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Baath Socialist Party and Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, at a public rally in Baghdad. He declared that Iraq's attitude in this regard is not motivated by any aggressive intent nor does it proceed from a policy of racialism or enmity towards a people. It is rather based on the inherent rights of sovereignty under international law. The breaking of diplomatic relations with the Iranian Government does not mean, as Mr. Hussain pointed out, that Iraq


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is against the people of Iran, but rather that Iraq is against the imperialistic policies of the Iranian government which aim at the humiliation and exploitation of peoples and the usurpation of their sovereign rights.

It is the Iranian Government which is wholly responsible for the deterioration of the relations between Iraq and Iran. It is, therefore, within the power of the Iranian Government to re-establish good-neighbourly relations with Iraq by renouncing Iranian aspirations to inherit the role of the erstwhile imperial power in the area and to seek instead cooperation and understanding with Iran's neighbours on a basis of true equality and mutual respect.

The Permanent Representative of Iraq avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Missions and Observers to the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.



New York City, February 4, 1972



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TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 215 OF 15 FEBRUARY AND TO ROUTINE TEHRAN  
INFO SAVING UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND WASHINGTON.

(25) - NY TELNO 198: IRAQI EXPULSIONS.

1. IRAQ REFUSED TO RECEIVE HOMANN-HERIMBERG. HE IS NOW NEVERTHELESS  
IN IRAN IN PURSUANCE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S INSTRUCTIONS. WE  
UNDERSTAND THAT SENIOR SECRETARIAT OFFICIALS HAVE CONSIDERABLE  
MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE WHOLE EXERCISE.

2. THERE HAS STILL BEEN NO PUBLICITY BUT WE MUST ASSUME THAT THE  
IRANIANS WILL SEEK TO EXPLOIT ANY FINDINGS FAVOURABLE TO THEM WHICH  
THEY CAN ATTRIBUTE TO HOMANN IN SUPPORTING THEIR DEMAND FOR  
INSCRIPTION OF THIS MATTER ON THE AGENDA OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS  
COMMISSION (YOUR TELNO 103).

FCO PASS SAVING UKMIS GENEVA, KUWAIT AND BAHRAIN.

JAMIESON

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**THE UNITED KINGDOM MISSION  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

**(Miss Hilary Reid)**

**845 THIRD AVENUE,  
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10022**

**Near Eastern Dept  
FCO**

**14.2.72.**

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RE	IN
REGISTRY No. 6	
16 FEB 1972	
UM 50/71	

Mr. Parsons

1. Mr. Smith
  2. Mr. Reeve
- 14.3.72

UN HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: PROPOSED ITEM ON EXPULSION OF  
IRANIANS FROM IRAQ

PROBLEM

1. Iran is seeking to inscribe an item at the Human Rights Commission session beginning in New York on 6 March entitled; "Mass Expulsion of Iranian Nationals from Iraq". Iraq, supported no doubt by some of the Arab Group, is likely to oppose inscription. The Iranians have asked us officially for our positive support on procedure and substance in what is almost certain to be an acrimonious debate. How should we react?

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

2. Prima facie, Iran has a strong case, as set out in their letter to the Secretary General of 11 January. In a letter of 8 February, and also in their tel no 189, our Mission at New York recommend that we should support inscription but not play a leading part in the debate. Sir P Ramsbotham, in his tel no 117, says he thinks that the Iranians will be satisfied if we support them on procedure and tactics, and also help them to obstruct any Iraqi move to keep their item off the agenda.
3. The Minister of State has minuted on this Tehran telegram: "We must try to help - but unobtrusively if possible".

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4. The stage is thus set for an acrimonious debate.

Princess Ashraf will be leading the Iranian delegation and is not likely to take local advice, either from her own or our Mission, to play things cool unless she has been instructed to do so by the Shah. The Iraqis may seek to have the proposed item ruled out of order on the grounds that it is inconsistent with Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which precludes the UN from taking a decision on matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state. <sup>(The Iraqis)</sup> They will be on thin ice if they do this, since this is arguably an international rather than a domestic issue. They may also take the line that most of the expelled Iranians were present illegally in Iraq, and that they only returned those who were without proper identification and/or security papers.

5. In either event we should have to tread warily, since Article 2(7), threadbare though it is, is the main bulwark between us and UN discussion of Northern Ireland. More generally, at the March meeting our delegation is likely to be under attack because of the activities of the Pearce Commission; there is even an outside chance that we may not secure reelection to the Human Rights Commission at ECOSOC in May.

6. There is a further possible complication. The Iraqis may, as well as opposing inscription, put down as a counter-item, the "expulsion" by Iran on 1 December of the 150-odd Tunb islanders. (The connection in Iraqi minds between developments in the Southern Gulf and the expulsion of the Iranians from Iraq is very clear, though there were no doubt other contributory factors behind the expulsions.) If the Iraqis succeed in achieving inscription of a separate counter-item, almost all the Arab Group would feel bound to support them; the Iranians would inevitably



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seek maximum British support in opposing the item at all stages; and there would then be a real risk that Security Council interest in the Islands settlement would revive. For our part, we should in this scenario appear to be taking the side of Iran against the Arabs over two humanitarian causes rather than one.

7. The case for warning the Iranians privately without further delay about this possible complication seems strong, though whether they will play their proposed item with more subtlety as a result of our warning remains to be seen.

RECOMMENDATION

8. I accordingly recommend that:

- (a) Our delegation at New York should be instructed to support the inscription of the proposed Iranian item if they find themselves in respectable company (there are already signs that this exists);
- (b) The delegation should oppose Iraqi attempts to obstruct inscription, provided that they do not find themselves alone or nearly alone in doing so;
- (c) The delegation should play no part in the substance of the debate apart from a brief reiteration of majority sentiment; and that
- (d) Sir P Ramsbotham at Tehran and also our Representative at New York, at his discretion, should while assuring the Iranians of our support at the procedural stage and behind the scenes, draw their attention to the possibility of an Iraqi counter-item on the lines sketched out in para 6 above, with the subsequent risk of reopening discussion of the whole Islands settlement, possibly even in the Security Council.



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9. As there is bound to be a considerable amount of lobbying before the Human Rights Commission gets down to work next month, I attach a draft telegram setting out these recommendations. UN (Economic and Social) Department agree. A second draft telegram dealing with the specific question of the "compensation assessment committee" for the Tunbs islanders, which the Iranians are keen to press on with, is also attached.

11 February 1972

  
S L Egerton  
Arabian Department

Copies to:  
Mr Keeble (UN (E&S) Dept)  
Mr Acland (Arabian Dept)  
Mr Darwin (Legal Advisers)  
Mr Stratton (UN (Political))



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TO IMMEDIATE UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NUMBER 103 OF 11 FEBRUARY  
INFO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN PRIORITY BAHRAIN RESIDENCY CAIRO KUWAIT  
WASHINGTON ABU DHABI DUBAI JEDDA.

TEHRAN TEL NO. <sup>117</sup>119 AND YOUR TEL NO. 189 (NOT TO ALL).  
- NEW 3/324/1 (23)

HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION : PROVISIONAL ITEM ON EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. IF, AS SEEMS LIKELY, THE IRANIANS INSIST ON INSCRIBING SUCH AN ITEM, AN ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE NEXT MONTH SEEMS INEVITABLE. OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO TRY AND ENSURE THAT THE IRAQIS AND OTHER EXTREME ARABS DO NOT DIVERT THE DEBATE INTO A DISCUSSION OF THE ISLANDS SETTLEMENT ON THE PRETEXT OF HUMANITARIAN CONCERN FOR THE TUNB ISLANDERS. THIS COULD WELL HAPPEN IF THE IRANIANS ARE DETERMINED TO PRESS HOME THIER ATTACK: AND IF IT DOES, THE IRANIANS WILL NO DOUBT COUNT ON US TO TAKE THE LEAD IN OPPOSING ANY PARALLEL RESOLUTION OR CALL FOR ACTION AFFECTING THE TUNB ISLANDERS. WE COULD THUS STAND TO INCUR ARAB DISPLEASURE ON TWO FRONTS.

2. GIVEN ALL THESE CONSIDERATIONS, WE STRONGLY ENDORSE THE RECOMMENDATION IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 4 OF YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE. YOU SHOULD SUPPORT INSCRIPTION OF THE ITEM IF THE IRANIANS GO AHEAD AS PLANNED (SEE ALSO PARAGRAPH 5 BELOW), PROVIDED THE AMERICANS AND OTHER RESPECTABLE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION DO SO ALSO. YOU MAY IF NECESSARY OPPOSE IRAQI ATTEMPTS TO BLOCK INSCRIPTION, BUT YOU SHOULD REFER FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS IF IT LOOKS AS THOUGH YOU ARE LIKELY TO BE VIRTUALLY ALONE IN DOING THIS. THEREAFTER, IN DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE, YOU SHOULD LET OTHERS MAKE THE RUNNING.

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3. HM AMBASSADOR, TEHRAN HAS DISCRETION TO DISCUSS WITH THE IRANIANS THE DANGER THAT A PROLONGED DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE COULD SERVE THE ISLANDS QUESTION. IF THE IRANIANS POINT OUT THAT THEY ARE TACTICALLY IN A GOOD POSITION ON THE TUNB ISLANDERS HAVING (A) REPATRIATED THE WOUNDED RAS AL KHAJMAH POLICEMEN AND (B) REPEATEDLY OFFERED TO MAKE A START ON COMPENSATION, IT COULD BE POINTED OUT THAT THESE POINTS WILL NOT NECESSARILY CARRY MUCH WEIGHT WITH THE ARABS, WHO ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH THE 'UNIVERSALITY' OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE. WE AND THE IRANIANS HAVE A MAJOR COMMON INTEREST IN NOT (NOT) LETTING A CLIMATE OF OPINION DEVELOP IN A FUNCTIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE REOPENING OF THE ISLANDS ISSUE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
4. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO MAKE THE SAME POINTS TO HOVEIDA IN NEW YORK AND/OR TO PRINCESS ASHRAF WHEN SHE ARRIVES. HM EMBASSY AT WASHINGTON SHOULD ALSO BRIEF THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON OUR THINKING.
5. ALL THE ABOVE IS OF COURSE SUBJECT TO ANY UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MEANTIME.

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
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TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 137 15 FEBRUARY INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, CAIRO, KUWAIT, WASHINGTON, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA.

SAVING TO UKMIS GENEVA.

<sup>(29)</sup>  
YOURTEL NO 103 TO NEW YORK: HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. I SAW THE UNDER-SECRETARY FOR UNITED NATIONS AFFAIRS THIS MORNING. HE TOLD ME THAT HOMANN-HERIMBERG FROM THE UNHCR'S OFFICE (UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO. 198) HAD ARRIVED AND WAS VISITING THE REFUGEE CAMPS IN THE SOUTH TO OBSERVE CONDITIONS AND NOTE REPORTS. THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAD APPARENTLY REFUSED TO RECEIVE HIM.

2. ACCORDING TO NAYYERI THE IRANIANS HAVE ALREADY HAD ASSURANCES FROM SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS CONFIRMING THAT THEY WOULD SUPPORT THE INSCRIPTION OF THE IRANIAN ITEM. I SAID WE WERE AT PRESENT ALSO DISPOSED TO DO THIS IF THE IRANIANS WENT AHEAD AS PLANNED. WE WERE READY TO CO-OPERATE AND DISCUSS TACTICS WITH THE IRANIAN DELEGATION, AND IN THIS CONTEXT I DREW NAYYERI'S ATTENTION TO THE DANGERS OF A PROLONGED AND ACRIMONIOUS DEBATE ENABLING THE IRAQIS TO INJECT A POLITICAL DISCUSSION OF THE ISLANDS' SETTLEMENT. I ALSO MADE THE POINTS IN PARA 3 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

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3. NAYYERI SAID THAT, AS FAR AS HE WAS CONCERNED, I WAS PREACHING TO THE CONVERTED. HE HAD PRECISELY THIS DANGER IN MIND WHEN HE HAD PREVIOUSLY ASSURED ME THAT IRAN WOULD WISH TO AVOID ANY MOVE WHICH MIGHT PROVE EMBARRASSING (MY TEL NO. 117). FOR THE SAME REASON HE HAD NOT ASKED WHETHER WE WOULD SUPPORT ANY SUBSTANTIVE RESOLUTION.

4. I TOLD HIM THAT HOVEIDA HAD ASKED OUR DELEGATION IN NEW YORK FOR SUPPORT ON SUBSTANCE AND HAD APPARENTLY MENTIONED THE POSSIBILITY OF SECURING COMPENSATION. NAYYERI SAID THAT THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NOT YET DECIDED WHAT THEY WOULD AIM FOR IF THE ITEM WAS INSCRIBED, BUT HE WOULD CERTAINLY BE RECOMMENDING THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ADVICE WE WERE GIVING WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS VERY SOUND. HE COULD NOT SAY WHETHER HIS RECOMMENDATIONS WOULD BE APPROVED (THEY WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE SHAH) BUT HE WOULD LET ME KNOW AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. PRINCESS ASHRAF WOULD PROBABLY ARRIVE IN NEW YORK ON ABOUT 2 OR 3 MARCH.

FCO PASS SAVING UKMIS GENEVA.  
RAMSBOTHAM.

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TO PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 606 OF  
17 FEBRUARY INFO PRIORITY UKMIS NEW YORK TEHRAN ROUTINE BAHRAIN  
RESIDENCY CAIRO KUWAIT ABU DHABI DUBAI AND JEDDA.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 103 TO UKMIS NEW YORK: EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. DRAWING ON TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE, TEHRAN TELEGRAM NO 117 -  
AND UKMIS NEW YORK TELEGRAM NO 189, WE SPOKE TO MIKLOS TODAY,  
EXPLAINING OUR PRESENT THINKING ON THIS SUBJECT AND MENTIONING  
IN PARTICULAR OUR CONCERN ABOUT A POSSIBLE COUNTER-ATTACK BY THE  
IRAQIS.

2. MIKLOS SAID THAT THE AMERICANS HAD RECEIVED A BROADLY SIMILAR  
APPROACH FROM THE IRANIANS, THROUGH NAYYERI IN TEHRAN AND HOVEIDA IN  
NEW YORK. THE IRANIANS HAD ASKED FOR AMERICAN SUPPORT IN INSCRIBING  
AN ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, BUT HAD  
GONE ON TO ASK FOR AMERICAN INTERVENTION WITH THOSE MEMBERS OF THE  
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WHO HAD NO MISSIONS IN TEHRAN (MOSTLY LATIN  
AMERICAN COUNTRIES). THE IRANIANS HAD STRESSED THAT PUBLIC OPINION  
IN IRAN NECESSITATED SOME DISCUSSION OF THE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS  
OF THE EXPULSION OF 60,000 IRANIANS FROM IRAQ IN AN INTERNATIONAL  
FORUM. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD CONSIDERED THIS A REASONABLE  
REQUEST AND HAD PROMISED THEIR SUPPORT FOR INSCRIPTION OF THE ITEM.  
THEY HAD ADDITIONALLY INSTRUCTED THE US MISSION IN NEW YORK TO  
APPROACH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION.

3. IN A SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATION IN NEW YORK HOVEIDA HAD SAID  
THAT THE IRANIANS INTENDED TO APPROACH THIS QUESTION IN AN  
OBJECTIVE AND LOW KEY MANNER. THEY WOULD NOT RAISE POLITICAL  
ISSUES NOR DISPUTE IRAQ'S LEGAL RIGHT TO EXPEL FOREIGN NATIONALS.  
THEY WOULD CONCENTRATE RATHER ON THE MANNER OF THE EXPULSION AND THE  
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INVOLVED. HOVEIDA HAD SAID THAT HE  
THOUGHT THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES, AS WELL AS  
MOST OF THE ARABS, COULD NOT MAKE UP THEIR MINDS HOW TO REACT.  
HE THOUGHT THAT THE POLISH CHAIRMAN MIGHT TRY TO AVOID DEBATE BY  
SIMPLY TAKING NOTE OF THE IRANIAN COMPLAINT, IN WHICH CASE IRAN  
WOULD HAVE TO INSIST ON INSCRIBING A SEPARATE ITEM.

/ 4. MIKLOS

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4. MIKLOS CONFESSED THAT THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD NOT CONSIDERED THE IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRAQI COUNTER-ATTACK ON IRAN OVER THE TUNBS. HE WAS GLAD TO HAVE HIS ATTENTION DRAWN TO THIS POINT, ALTHOUGH HIS FIRST REACTIONS WERE THAT THE IRAQIS WERE LIKELY TO SE DISSUADED FROM SUCH A COURSE BY LACK OF SUPPORT FROM THEIR ARAB BROTHERS.

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TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO 267 OF 23 FEBRUARY INFO TEHRAN AND INFO  
SAVING WASHINGTON BAHRAIN RESIDENCY KUWAIT CAIRO ABU DHABI  
DUBAI JEDDA.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 606 TO F C O. — (31)

EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE INFORMED IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THAT WE CAN SUPPORT THE INSCRIPTION OF THE ITEM AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BUT THAT WE SHALL PROBABLY FIND IT WISER NOT (NOT) TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE. AGAINST THE IRAQI TACTIC OF COUNTER ATTACK OVER THE ISLANDS, THE IRANIANS SHOULD WE ADDED CONSIDER HOW FAR IT WAS WISE TO FACILITATE ARGUMENT WHICH COULD DISRUPT EFFORTS AT CO-OPERATION AMONG LITTORAL STATES. WE ADDED FRANKLY THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN PROVOKING POSSIBLE FURTHER SEIZURES OF BRITISH INTERESTS AS IN LIBYA.
2. HOVEYDA SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POSITION AND THAT IT WAS QUITE SATISFACTORY TO HIM. HE HAD NOT YET CONSULTED HIS GOVERNMENT ON TACTICS AND WOULD NOT DO SO UNTIL AFTER HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO TAKE THE PULSE OF DELEGATES ARRIVING FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. BUT HE THOUGHT, SUBJECT TO INSTRUCTIONS, THAT HE MUST NOT ONLY SECURE INSCRIPTION BUT ALSO GET QUOTE SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION UNQUOTE IF POSSIBLE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT GET THEIR WAY ON THIS BECAUSE BOTH THE SOVIET /UNION

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UNION AND THE ARABS WOULD BE ANNOYED AT THE DIVERSION OF ATTENTION FROM ISRAEL AND MIGHT BE GLAD TO GET THE IRANIAN ITEM OUT OF THE WAY WITH A RESOLUTION BUT COMPARATIVELY LITTLE DISCUSSION. CONVERSELY, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SEEK INSCRIPTION AS A SEPARATE ITEM AND NOT AS A SUB-ITEM UNDER ITEM 10. UNDER THE LATTER THE IRANIAN CASE MIGHT BE LOST IN VARIOUS OTHER ISSUES, NOT LEAST THE BIHARI PROBLEM WHICH HE FEARED THAT THE PAKISTANIS WOULD INSIST ON RAISING.

3. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. FULLER REPORT BY BAG. MEANWHILE HOVEYDA WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WE DID NOT (NOT) RELAY PARA 2 ABOVE TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

4. AT ONE POINT HOVEYDA SUGGESTED THAT IRAN WOULD NOT MIND FACING A COUNTER ATTACK OVER THE ISLANDS, BECAUSE THE SPEEDY DISPOSAL OF THE IRAQI PROPOSAL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD PREVENTED HER GETTING HER REPLY ON THE RECORD. WE COUNTERED THIS LINE OF THINKING UNCOMPROMISINGLY. WE SAID THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION TO SHELVE THE IRAQI COMPLAINT WAS THE CLEAREST, THOUGH MUTE, INDICATION TO THE WORLD AT LARGE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT CONSIDER IT WORTH PROCEEDING WITH. THIS SHOULD SUIT <sup>IRAN</sup> IRAQ PERFECTLY. WE DID NOT SEE THAT ANY IRANIAN INTEREST COULD BE SERVED BY RE-OPENING THE ARGUMENT.

F C O PASS SAVING BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT, CAIRO, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA.

JAMIESON

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TO ROUTINE F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO. 270 DATED 23 FEBRUARY, 1972,  
 INFO ROUTINE TO TEHRAN, WASHINGTON, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT,  
 CAIRO, ABU DHABI, DUBAI AND JEDDA.

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MY TELEGRAM NO. 267: PARA. 4: FOURTH SENTENCE TO READ:

THIS SHOULD SUIT IRAN (IRAN) PERFECTLY.

JAMIESON

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845 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10022

18/18/25

R M Evans Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office  
London S W 1.

24 February 1972.

*If Princess Ashraf can really be kept out of the matter (and if she decides to take part her exclusion would be very difficult) the Iranians may be more easily kept to a rational line.*

M. Eganby.

Miss Beckett.

I agree.

Minute.

15.43

Dear Richard,

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## HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION: IRAQI EXPULSION OF IRANIANS

- att 11
1. This is to supplement our telegram No. 267 of 23 February about my conversation with Hoveyda.
  2. Hoveyda emphasised to start with that he was not consulting his Government about detail and tactics, or even giving them a prognosis, at this point. For that reason he would be grateful if what he said to me did not get back to his people in Tehran. He saw no point in working all this out until much nearer the time. He, incidentally, would be handling the matter in the Human Rights Commission. As a matter of policy, Princess Ashraf would keep out of it and disappear from the room while it was under discussion.
  3. The first point on tactics was that this must be a separate Item, for the reason given in our telegram under reference. The debate of substance could develop over inscription. He would state the case for inscription; the Iraqis would no doubt reply with counter material over the Islands; he would then no doubt have to deal with the allegations about the Islands at the same time as insisting on the case for inscription.
  4. He thought that he would get inscription, if only because the Arabs would want to get on with accusations about Israel and would not want a protracted debate. For that reason he hoped there would be a wide consensus in the Commission for inscription. It would then be up to him to ensure that the Item inscribed was then reached and discussed, which might not be easy.
  5. Assuming that he did not fail on inscription, he thought that his Government would be anxious to have a resolution of some kind and he thought that there were good chances of getting this. The main factor here was, again, his belief that the Commission would be prepared to have a resolution of some kind as a means of getting the item out of the way. It could be a simple resolution calling upon the two parties to resolve their differences; this he thought would seem inadequate to his Government. Or it could be a resolution providing for good offices or other intervention by the Secretary-General; or a resolution referring the matter for study by an ad hoc or other group; or a resolution upholding the Iranian case and explicitly or otherwise condemning Iraq for violation of human rights. He thought the last of these unlikely, because it would be too contentious for the patience of a Commission which wanted to get on with other things. He feared he would be competing for time with the Pakistanis, who, however unwisely, seemed certain to try to press the question of Biharis and refugees in West Pakistan.

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✓ 6. The Secretary-General's official, Homann-Herenberg, has just returned from Iran and is preparing a report for the Secretary-General. Hoveyda does not know, and we do not know, what it is going to consist of. He will try to get hold of it, or at least get an indication of its content. He has said that he would expect to deploy the fact of Homann-Herenberg's mission and also the contents of his report in developing his case. He conceded that he did not know if the Secretary-General would be prepared to have any report to him made public. (Hoveyda's impression (which is also ours) is that the Arab group are embarrassed over this issue and do not really want to back up the Iraqis. Hoveyda spoke scathingly of the excuses the Arabs made to him when they said that they would nevertheless have to support the Iraqi case, pleading their public opinions. The Arabs should be persuaded to stand up like men and refuse to bend with the wind; the technique of the new Amir of Qatar showed that the Arabs well knew that they could buy off their public opinion when it suited them. On this I commented that it was simply not easy. The recent history of the Arab world should indicate to Iran that extremist Arab opinion was, whether we liked it or not, a potent force which the Russians and others could exploit. We had consistently argued to his Government that they must not underrate this in working for the security of the Gulf area; and my advice, for what it was worth, was that he should not underrate it either.

7. Our telegram under reference reported what I had said when Hoveyda suggested that it would be quite a good idea to get the Iranian riposte on the Islands on the record. Hoveyda certainly took note of the points I made. I am less confident that the Iranians will respect them. After all, their interest is different from ours in that they would quite welcome an opportunity to embroil us in the de facto settlement of the Islands question which they enforced. You and the Embassy in Tehran have of course been trying to head them off this dangerous line of thinking throughout, and I do not suggest there is anything new to attempt on this. For obvious reasons I avoided any discussion of the background to the Iranian landings on the Islands.

8. Hoveyda is something of a lightweight, and it is just possible that his attempts to make a major issue of this Item will not get very far in the Commission. But I imagine that he will have pretty tough instructions, and I think that we may be in for somewhat embarrassing exchanges.

✓ 9. It may be worth adding that I asked him just who these people were. First he said that they were all of Iranian race, not of Arab race. Secondly, while saying that some of them had been in Iraq for generations, he virtually conceded that the bulk of them were comparatively recent settlers in Iraq. When I asked about their documentation he took the line that in many cases it had been taken from them, which I imagine means that they did not have any in the first place. He also said that one of the difficulties was that these people were often small independent artisans or small shopkeepers; they did not fit into the economic planning for Iran, which required organisation and factory workers rather than individual entrepreneurs. I do not suppose, however, that any of this is news to you.

*Yours ever,*  
*Donal*

(D J McCarthy)

cc. to : T W Keeble Esq., UN (E&S) Department, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, S.W.1.  
D F Murray, Esq., Tehran.

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TO ROUTINE F C O TELNO 267 OF 23 FEBRUARY INFO TEHRAN AND INFO  
SAVING WASHINGTON BAHRAIN RESIDENCY KUWAIT CAIRO ABU DHABI  
DUBAI JEDDA.

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM NO 606 TO F C O.

EXPULSIONS FROM IRAQ.

1. WE HAVE INFORMED IRANIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE THAT WE CAN SUPPORT THE INSCRIPTION OF THE ITEM AT THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION BUT THAT WE SHALL PROBABLY FIND IT WISER NOT (NOT) TO TAKE AN ACTIVE PART IN DISCUSSION OF SUBSTANCE. AGAINST THE IRAQI TACTIC OF COUNTER ATTACK OVER THE ISLANDS, THE IRANIANS SHOULD WE ADDED CONSIDER HOW FAR IT WAS WISE TO FACILITATE ARGUMENT WHICH COULD DISRUPT EFFORTS AT CO-OPERATION AMONG LITTORAL STATES. WE ADDED FRANKLY THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN PROVOKING POSSIBLE FURTHER SEIZURES OF BRITISH INTERESTS AS IN LIBYA.
2. HOVEYDA SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THIS POSITION AND THAT IT WAS QUITE SATISFACTORY TO HIM. HE HAD NOT YET CONSULTED HIS GOVERNMENT ON TACTICS AND WOULD NOT DO SO UNTIL AFTER HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO TAKE THE PULSE OF DELEGATES ARRIVING FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION. BUT HE THOUGHT, SUBJECT TO INSTRUCTIONS, THAT HE MUST NOT ONLY SECURE INSCRIPTION BUT ALSO GET QUOTE SOME KIND OF RESOLUTION UNQUOTE IF POSSIBLE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT GET THEIR WAY ON THIS BECAUSE BOTH THE SOVIET /UNION

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UNION AND THE ARABS WOULD BE ANNOYED AT THE DIVERSION OF ATTENTION FROM ISRAEL AND MIGHT BE GLAD TO GET THE IRANIAN ITEM OUT OF THE WAY WITH A RESOLUTION BUT COMPARATIVELY LITTLE DISCUSSION. CONVERSELY, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SEEK INSCRIPTION AS A SEPARATE ITEM AND NOT AS A SUB-ITEM UNDER ITEM 10. UNDER THE LATTER THE IRANIAN CASE MIGHT BE LOST IN VARIOUS OTHER ISSUES, NOT LEAST THE BIHARI PROBLEM WHICH HE FEARED THAT THE PAKISTANIS WOULD INSIST ON RAISING.

3. WE AGREED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. FULLER REPORT BY BAG. MEANWHILE HOVEYDA WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF WE DID NOT (NOT) RELAY PARA 2 ABOVE TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

4. AT ONE POINT HOVEYDA SUGGESTED THAT IRAN WOULD NOT MIND FACING A COUNTER ATTACK OVER THE ISLANDS, BECAUSE THE SPEEDY DISPOSAL OF THE IRAQI PROPOSAL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL HAD PREVENTED HER GETTING HER REPLY ON THE RECORD. WE COUNTERED THIS LINE OF THINKING UNCOMPROMISINGLY. WE SAID THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S DECISION TO SHELVE THE IRAQI COMPLAINT WAS THE CLEAREST, THOUGH MUTE, INDICATION TO THE WORLD AT LARGE THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL DID NOT CONSIDER IT WORTH PROCEEDING WITH. THIS SHOULD SUIT IRAQ PERFECTLY. WE DID NOT SEE THAT ANY IRANIAN INTEREST COULD BE SERVED BY RE-OPENING THE ARGUMENT.

F C O PASS SAVING BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, KUWAIT, CAIRO, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, JEDDA.

JAMIESON

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Mr. Parsons AD 19/2

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REGISTRY No. 10  
- 1 MAR 1972

HRC: forthcoming debate on  
Iraqi expulsions of Iranians.

Please see Mr McCarthy's sensible letter of 24 Feb. below. It is a relief to know that he will be handling the forthcoming debate for us.

2. As he says, Hoveyda will have tough instructions, & being a novice in U.N. terms, looks likely to overplay his hand. It is unconceivable that Princess Ashraf would stay out of the mêlée (§2). The Division will have to keep a close eye on the proceedings & let us know in time/to



to send instructions to Sir Q.

Rambhatham to get a message  
to the Shah so that he can instruct  
the Princess, if need be, to 'cool it'.  
She will not listen to anyone else,  
particularly not Hoveyda.

Argentin 28/2

Mr Lavey }  
Mr. Smith } 29 1/2.  
12/1/



UNITED NATIONS  
ECONOMIC  
AND  
SOCIAL COUNCIL



*[Handwritten signature]*  
13/7



Distr.  
GENERAL

E/CN.4/1094  
23 February 1972

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS  
Twenty-eighth session  
Item 11 of the provisional agenda

MASS EXPULSION OF IRANIAN NATIONALS FROM IRAQ  
(ITEM PROPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN)

Letter dated 18 February 1972 from the Permanent Representative  
of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

With reference to the letter of the Permanent Representative of Iran dated 6 January 1972 (E/CN.4/1092), I have the honour, upon instructions from my Government, to point out that the Iranian request for the inclusion of the so-called "mass expulsion of Iranian nationals from Iraq" as an item in the agenda of the twenty-eighth session of the Commission on Human Rights constitutes an open and completely unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of Iraq. Furthermore, my Government totally rejects the false allegations contained in the Iranian explanatory note concerning unfounded "violations" of human rights, which the Iranian Government is using as a transparent pretext in order to divert world attention from its unabated policies of aggression and other illegal actions against Iraq and other neighbouring Arab States.

The Iranian note's wild accusations of "systematic harassment, imprisonment, torture, seizure and confiscation of property" to which Iranian residents in Iraq are supposed to have been subjected in recent years, is utterly refuted by the very presence of the many Iranians residing in Iraq. Had the Iranians been as badly mistreated as the note claims, they would have left Iraq long ago - and the Iraqi authorities would not be confronted with the problem of the illegal influx of Iranians into Iraq. The fact is that large numbers of Iranians annually and for various reasons come to Iraq; and the very long borders between the two countries provide easy access to illegal entrants. It is incumbent upon neighbouring States, in accordance with international practice, to co-operate in order to ensure every possible control of such illegal movement across their common boundaries. Regrettably, the Government of Iran has not extended such co-operation, thus greatly contributing to the illegal entry of Iranian nationals into Iraq.

The people of Iraq have been known through the ages for their generous hospitality to all those who sought shelter and refuge within their country. They have always welcomed their Iranian neighbours to whom they are bound by the closest



religious, historical and cultural ties, and have accorded them shelter and work opportunities. However, for obvious economic, social and security reasons, a large influx of illegal immigrants cannot be condoned, no matter how liberal and generous the immigration policies of a State may be. Iraqi authorities had every right to take the legal action ordained by Iraqi law against illegal immigrants. The law prescribes the imposition of fines and prison terms: no such action was taken against the Iranians illegally residing in Iraq. They were neither fined nor thrown into prison. They were escorted with the necessary facilities to the borders of their own country. As for the "inhuman treatment" that the deportees were supposed to have received "at the hands of the security police", that particular allegation is denied by the deportees themselves, as reported in The New York Times of 31 January 1972.

The validity of the Iranian accusations against Iraq may be judged by the glaring inconsistencies and discrepancies to be found in the claims and statements made by various Iranian official sources. These sources seem to have settled, after some wide fluctuations, on a number of approximately 60,000 Iranians, said to have been deported from Iraq during the past three and a half months (The New York Times of 31 January mentions 48,000). According to the Iranian note, more than 30,000, that is over half of the total number, were deported, incredibly, in one night! But the Permanent Representative of Iran seems to have had second - and third - thoughts about that number too. He decreased the number of those deported on that single night by 6,000 within three days. On 4 January, the Permanent Representative told a correspondent of The New York Times that the number was 36,000 (as quoted in The New York Times of 5 January 1972). In a note he circulated to the permanent representatives and observers to the United Nations, dated 5 January, he states that the number was 33,000; finally, in his letter of 6 January to the Secretary-General, he brings the number down to 30,000.

What is even more amazing is that the Permanent Representative of Iran saw fit, in his circular note of 6 January, to claim that "almost 3,800 Iraqis including some non-commissioned officers of the Iraqi Army were secreted among Iranian expellees". The international edition of the Teheran daily Kayhan of 8 January, on the other hand, quotes the Shah as follows: "The monarch also told newsmen that 300 suspected Iraqi spies had infiltrated among the expellees. They will be tried and, if convicted, executed shortly. He also confirmed that some of them had explosives and arms when they were captured." The Times of London of 17 January reports from Teheran, however, that a group of 120 Iranians will go on trial before a military court on charges of espionage, sabotage and subversion. According to The Times, a security spokesman "alleged at a press conference that the group arrested during the past five months had been trained in Iraq and East Germany".

The Government of Iraq has categorically rejected the Iranian allegation concerning the presence of Iraqi nationals among those deported as being totally unfounded. The attempt to implicate Iraqis in the whole affair is an obvious manoeuvre to detract attention from the troubles the Iranian authorities are having with their own nationals, and an expedient way of dealing with Iranian dissidents.



The Iranian note claims that the Iranian Government is faced "with the most difficult problems in the border area" and that the situation is so grave that "urgent assistance has been requested from the International Red Cross". It is very sad indeed to know that the Imperial Government of Iran, which could extend its most generous hospitality to thousands of foreign dignitaries and entertain them on the lavish and extravagant scale so widely publicized during the recent celebrations held to commemorate the founding of the Iranian Empire, should now be reduced to ask the help of the International Red Cross and the United Nations to enable it to shelter and to cater to some thousands of Iranian nationals.

It is rather unfortunate too that the Iranian note chose to assert the Iranian Government's "long-standing tradition of living in peace and harmony with all nations, especially its neighbours" and to reaffirm its "desire to foster good-neighbourly relations with Iraq". Iraq's complaints against the illegal acts and aggressions of the Iranian Government are in the records of the United Nations.

On 19 April 1969, the Government of Iran declared "null and void" the valid and mutually binding "Boundary Treaty of 1937 between Iraq and Iran". This illegal act was accompanied and followed by various actions which encroached upon Iraqi sovereignty and territorial integrity, hence creating a situation detrimental to the good relations between the neighbouring countries and dangerously threatening the peace and security of the area. While affirming the validity of the 1937 Treaty, the Iraqi Government reacted with great patience and self-restraint. It has sought to resolve this problem peacefully in accordance with the rules and principles of international law. Iraq has often called upon the Government of Iran, in the United Nations and outside it, to respect its treaty obligations and to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice regarding the validity of the 1937 Boundary Treaty. Unfortunately, the attitude of Iran has been totally negative, and allegations such as those contained in the Iranian note were often used to obscure and confuse the real issue.

On 29 and 30 November 1971, Iranian armed forces and naval units invaded and occupied three Arab islands situated so strategically in the Gulf, Iraq's only outlet to the open seas, that they could pose a direct threat to Iraq's vital economic and other national interests. The Security Council is still seized of the complaint lodged by Iraq and four other Arab States against that act of aggression perpetrated by the Iranian Government.

Finally, on the night of 15 January 1972, Iranian armed units attempted an incursion into Iraqi territory, and in the armed conflict which ensued one Iraqi policeman was killed and an Iranian soldier was taken prisoner. In the light of these facts, the statements made in the Iranian note are reduced to a meaningless boast, hollow and hypocritical. They are as far from the truth as all the other allegations and accusations contained in that note.

I should like to express again the sincere hope of the Government of Iraq that the Iranian Government will observe the recognized rules and principles of international law, show the necessary respect for its treaty obligations, and desist from its policies of aggression and territorial acquisition, thus paving the way for the good-neighbourly relations which my Government earnestly desires.

/...



I should be grateful if this letter could kindly be circulated as a document of the United Nations.

(Signed) Abdul Karim AL-SHAIKHLY  
Permanent Representative

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(36)



British Embassy  
Tehran

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

21 MAR 1972

NEQ 3/324/1

Your reference

Our reference 3/1

Date 15 March 1972

B Smith Esq  
Near Eastern Department  
FCO

Dear Brian,

IRAN/IRAQ RELATIONS

There have been rumours that the Afghans, who look after Iraqi interests here, have been active in trying to improve relations between Iran and Iraq. Shafiq, the Afghan Foreign Minister, saw Khalatbari in Jeddah during the Islamic Conference, afterwards visited Baghdad, and then stopped in Tehran on his way back to Kabul. Any idea that Iran might be dealing with "murderers who send assassins to kill their opponents in other parts of the world" was strenuously denied here by Government sources, so strenuously in fact that we wondered whether there was anything behind it.

2. I went to see Mehr of the Afghan Embassy who told me that there was no truth at all in the rumour. ~~But when~~ I suggested that ~~now that the Russians seemed to be getting a foothold in Iraq~~ it might be in the Iranians interests to strengthen their influence in Baghdad rather than let things go from bad to worse, Mehr said that he did not foresee any improvement in Iran/Iraq relations in the foreseeable future. In any case, were mediation to be requested, they would not be inclined to provide it; he feared that they would only lose credit with both sides. Neither side trusted the Afghans much as it was, and the Persians trusted them even less than the Iraqis.

3. If the two sides did want to come together again, Mehr thought that the residual staff of both Embassies would be able to do the negotiating themselves. Despite the break of relations, there were still nine Iraqis in Tehran, some of whom had ostensibly been moved to consular and commercial jobs from their previous political work.

So why report?

Yours

Nick

N W Browne

Mr Smith, NED

Copied to:-

Chancery  
KABUL

LAST PAPER

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It is possible that Shafiq explored the possibility of using Afghan good offices, but he is unlikely to want to risk failure.

Followed up  
21/3



Mass Expulsion Of Persians And Kurds From Iraq; Baghdad Press Extracts. Political Relations Between Iraq And Iran. 1 Jan. 1972. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1732. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107477590/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=19e03115&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107477590/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=19e03115&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.